Lessons from

4 DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE
PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS
in Latin America and the Caribbean

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Lessons from
Four Decades of Infrastructure Project-Related Conflicts
in Latin America and the Caribbean

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Coordinator
Graham Watkins
Cataloging-in-Publication data provided by the
Inter-American Development Bank
Felipe Herrera Library
Watkins, Graham.
Lessons from four decades of infrastructure project related conflicts in Latin America and
the Caribbean
/ Graham Watkins, Sven-Uwe Mueller, Hendrik Meller, María Cecilia Ramirez, Tomás
Serebrisky, Andreas Georgoulias.
p. cm. — (IDB Monograph; 549)
Includes bibliographic references.1. Infrastructure (Economics)-Planning-Latin America. 2.
Infrastructure (Economics)-Planning-Caribbean Area. 3. Risk management-Latin America.
4. Risk management-Caribbean Area. 5. Conflict management-Latin America. 6. Conflict
management-Caribbean Area. I. Watkins, Graham. II. Mueller, Sven-Uwe. III. Meller,
Hendrik. IV. Ramirez, María Cecilia. V. Serebrisky, Tomás. VI. Georgoulias, Andreas.
VII. Inter-American Development Bank. Climate Change Division. VIII. Series.
IDB-MG-549
Key words: Infrastructure, Latin America, Risks, Sustainability
JEL codes: Q54, O2, Q51

Sven-Uwe Mueller
Inter-American Development Bank
For more information please contact
Graham Watkins | GWATKINS@iadb.org

The IDB thanks the team of the Zofnass Program for Sustainable Infrastructure for their
contribution:
Ioannis Blatsos
Julia Carvalho Fernandes de Oliveira
Cristina Contreras Casado
Nikos Georgoulias
Judith Rodriguez.

Copyright © [2017] Inter-American Development Bank. This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NCND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and
may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any non-commercial purpose. No
derivative work is allowed.
Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall
be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB’s name for
any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB’s logo shall be subject to a
separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as
part of this CC-IGO license.
Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.
The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the
countries they represent.

2

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Table of Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................... 4
1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE........................................................................ 5
1.1. Scope and Purpose of Report ............................................................... 5
1.2. Conflicts in Infrastructure Projects ......................................................... 5

Ensure that national laws are comprehensive and universal. ..................... 34
Design fair systems for distribution of project benefits................................ 36
5.2. Recommendations for Developers and Contractors .............................. 37
5.3. Recommendations for Lenders and Investors........................................ 38
6. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 40

2. RESEARCH METHODS .................................................................................. 6

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................... 41

3. DATA ............................................................................................................... 8
The 200 Project Database ............................................................................ 8
Interviews ................................................................................................... 10
Focus Group Validation of Results ............................................................. 10

ABBREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. 42

4. FINDINGS ...................................................................................................... 11
4.1. The Nature of Conflict is Multidimensional .......................................... 11
Environmental Drivers of Conflict ............................................................... 11
Social Drivers of Conflict ............................................................................ 12
Governance Drivers of Conflict................................................................... 13
Economic Drivers of Conflict ...................................................................... 14
Conflict Escalation ...................................................................................... 15
4.2. Conflicts Cause Projects to Fail and Harm National Economies .......... 15
4.3. Conflicts Are Not Addressed Systematically .......................................... 18
General Company Actions ......................................................................... 18
Provision of Community Benefits................................................................ 21
Provision of Environmental Benefits ........................................................... 22
4.4. Conflicts Affect Each Infrastructure Sector Differently ......................... 22
4.5. Projects Are Vulnerable to Conflicts Early On ..................................... 23
4.6. Lack of Upstream Planning Is a Dominant Driver of Conflict ............... 25
4.7. The Institutional Capacity of Countries is Important to Contain a Conflict
................................................................................................................... 27
4.8. Sustainable Planning Can Mitigate Conflicts ....................................... 29
4.9. A System for Conflict Identification, Management and Resolution Will
Provide Value to Companies ...................................................................... 33
4.10. IFI-funded Projects Address Conflicts More Effectively ..................... 33
4.11. The Study of Conflicts is an Open-ended Process ............................ 34

LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................. 43
APPENDICES .................................................................................................... 44
APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS AND DATA
SAMPLING ................................................................................................. 44
APPENDIX B: KEY QUESTIONS THAT ARISE FROM THIS STUDY ....... 46
APPENDIX C: DRIVERS OF CONFLICT PER SECTOR ........................... 47
APPENDIX D: CONFLICT DRIVERS THROUGHOUT THE YEARS ......... 54
APPENDIX E: TIMING OF CONFLICT AND FINAL PROJECT STATUS .. 58
APPENDIX F: EVOLUTION OF COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICTS
................................................................................................................... 59
APPENDIX G: CONFLICT ESCALATION, CONFLICT CONSEQUENCE,
AND COMPANY RESPONSE POINT SYSTEMS ...................................... 62
Conflict Escalation ...................................................................................... 62
Conflict Consequences............................................................................... 62
Company Response to Conflict .................................................................. 62
APPENDIX H: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF COUNTRIES AND
CONFLICT ................................................................................................. 63
APPENDIX I: PROJECT SCALE AND CONFLICT .................................... 64
APPENDIX J: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ................................................... 67
APPENDIX K: QUESTIONNAIRE .............................................................. 70
APPENDIX L: 200 PROJECT DATABASE ................................................. 71
APPENDIX M: CODING ANALYSIS........................................................... 78
APPENDIX N: COMPOSITE DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR ...................... 84

5. RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................. 34
5.1. Recommendations for States and Governments ................................. 34

3

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report investigates the nature and consequences of conflict in
infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC). To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first study on this scale at the
infrastructure industry. A hybrid quantitative and qualitative research
approach provided the data for the study. 32 interviews were conducted
with 42 sustainability experts involved in the development of infrastructure
in LAC. Then, a database of 200 conflict-affected infrastructure projects
across six sectors was created to assess the nature and drivers of
conflicts, the companies’ response to conflicts, and the material
implications for projects, companies, and societies.
Our analysis demonstrates that the nature of conflicts is multidimensional,
and more dynamic than traditionally conceived by both firms and
governments. Most conflicts materialize through the interaction of
environmental, social, governance, and economic drivers over a long
period. Overall, deficient planning, reduced access to resources, lack of
community benefits, and lack of adequate consultation were the most
prominent conflict drivers. In many cases, conflicts escalated because
grievances and community concerns accumulated, going unresolved for
many years. In general, conflicts may arise during any phase of an
infrastructure project, but our analysis shows that the earliest phases are
increasingly vulnerable to conflicts. Most projects in the database that
were cancelled or postponed faced conflicts before operations.
The consequences of such conflicts are increasingly detrimental for
companies, investors, and national governments as conflicts cause
projects to fail and harm national economies. Of the 200 projects in the
database, 36 were cancelled because of conflicts, while 162 projects faced
delays, and 116 faced cost overruns. Although all six infrastructure sectors
evaluated in this research saw conflicts, resource, energy, and waste
projects saw a disproportionate share. Furthermore, conflicts escalated
more often in countries that lack the institutional capacity to manage them
effectively.

However, conflicts can be addressed effectively and on time, as wellplanned sustainable projects mitigate risks that lead to conflicts. Each firm
addresses conflicts differently, but those committed to develop sustainable
projects and take comprehensive action to mitigate conflicts in advance
are more likely to face less significant consequences and to implement
their projects to the end. Firms that fail to consider conflicts proactively or
choose to remain unresponsive to conflicts when they arise usually face
substantial consequences and are more likely to see their projects
cancelled or abandoned. Yet, even though in certain sectors firms have
changed their approach and implemented good practices for anticipating
and managing conflicts, the implementation of such practices in most
infrastructure projects is still limited. Many firms choose to remain
unresponsive to conflicts, or do not respond adequately and on time. In
most cases, risk and conflict management systems are ignored while
community engagement is regarded as a secondary requirement which
needs to be fulfilled in order to comply with regulations. Their crucial
function for preventing conflicts is often not seen.
Our research concludes with a set of strategies and policy
recommendations for governments, investors and developers that are
effective in mitigating risks and containing conflicts. Governments should
enhance regional upstream planning to generate better-prepared projects
that are not sited in conflictive locations. Developers should implement
proactive risk management systems, engage communities with targeted
programs and build trust early on. Lenders and investors should help
national governments enhance their institutional capacity, and establish
requirements for proactive risk and conflict management through funding
mechanisms. Such actions will provide the foundation for continuous
efforts to collaborate, disseminate good practices, and align incentives that
will lead to effective conflict resolution in infrastructure.
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

communities, but implementing high-quality infrastructure projects is
challenging.

1.1. Scope and Purpose of Report
This report assesses environmental and social conflicts in infrastructure
projects. The research focuses on how conflicts have evolved over the last
decades, and how firms respond to these conflicts. It identifies examples
for conflict resolution and concludes with a set of recommendations and
strategies that have been effective in helping firms manage such conflicts.
It should be noted that only conflictive projects were addressed in this
research. Furthermore, the report does not intend to calculate the
monetary cost of conflict for infrastructure firms. We included the costs
firms incurred from conflicts only when such figures, such as fines, budget
overruns, or lost income, were publicly available. However, the cost of
conflict in a project usually goes well beyond fines, and many of the
projects that incurred additional costs due to a conflict may not have such
a figure published. Therefore, we acknowledge that the cost for many of
the projects we have studied, if not all of them, is likely higher than the
fines or cost overruns that are stated in this report.

1.2. Conflicts in Infrastructure Projects
The Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) region faces an urgent need to
increase infrastructure investment. Up to US$250 billion is required
annually to close the estimated infrastructure gap of the region. i
Infrastructure is critical for economic growth and ensuring human wellbeing, but poorly planned projects can cause significant social and
environmental conflicts. On the other hand, high-quality projects can
generate long-lasting benefits, and are more attractive to public and private
investors. Well-planned and executed projects will be less likely to meet
public resistance or held up because of environmental or social concerns.
Such projects can reduce the risk of cost overruns and falling behind the
original projected benefits (e.g. not achieving the projected demand).
Infrastructure properly designed can bring multiple benefits to

The last decades have seen many projects affected by serious conflicts in
the LAC region. ii The Environmental Justice Atlas shows 423
environmental and social conflict cases currently in progress in the LAC
region. iii The vast requirements of infrastructure, and the potential
environmental degradation and community perturbation issues that might
ensue from these projects, are a major source of dispute between local
communities and project sponsors. iv Our examination of conflict incidents
also underscores the importance of socioeconomic issues to the local
communities. Among the greatest concerns is the fact that although the
communities have to bear all the environmental and social costs of the
projects and often lose access to resources, project benefits are not
adequately distributed to them. In addition, stakeholder engagement
processes are not adequate to secure effective consultation and
communication.v
Conflicts range from grassroots campaigns to widespread protests aiming
to stop projects.vi Research indicates that the vast majority of conflicts tend
to escalate to hostile confrontations, resulting in injuries, fatalities, and the
abandonment of projects.vii In fact, some conflicts have led to civil wars.viii
Although conflicts are likely to occur during every stage of a project’s life
cycle, including planning, exploration, pre-feasibility, feasibility,
construction, operations, expansion, closure, and post-closure, feasibility
and construction stages are the most likely stages for conflicts to arise.ix
Both stages allow for effective community mobilization.
Despite the prevalence of conflict in all major asset classes, published
research has focused primarily on the resources and mining sector and
much less on other infrastructure areas. Furthermore, the costs of conflicts
incurred by project companies are multifaceted and, almost invariably,
substantial, yet most firms have not been assessing them in a systematic
way. x For instance, both the resources and time required to manage
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conflicts, as well as their effects on the willingness of employees to remain
or join the company, are regularly overlooked. xi Delays and temporary
disruptions in the mining sector could lead to weekly losses of up to US$20
million.xii Moreover, a serious conflict could result in the loss of a firm’s
“social license to operate”, which could prevent firms from implementing
other projects and lead to significant losses as access to existing projects
and exploration of future projects is blocked or hindered.
Though the costs of conflicts are often not adequately reported publicly
and are regularly underestimated, many firms from the extractives sector,
which have experienced conflicts, have changed their approach for
managing theses risks: they anticipate possible sources of conflict and
manage upcoming conflicts much more proactively. For example, the
International Council on Mining and Metals, a consortium of mining and
metals companies and associations, was founded in 2001 to provide
guidance on implementing sustainability initiatives, partly in response to
the growing concerns over social and environmental conflicts. However,
similar responses in other infrastructure classes are limited to the level of
individual companies. Some companies have established their own
policies to avoid conflicts, focusing on stakeholder engagement from the
planning stage and respect for local customs and rules, as well as
facilitating initiatives to support communities in growing sustainably. xiii
It is important to note that research has also highlighted the importance of
using consensus-based approaches and redesigning benefits distributions
systems so the host communities could also receive enhanced benefits
from projects, in terms of improved services, capacity-building, and
employment initiatives.xiv However, this view is not shared by all firms, as
evidenced by the wide range of social and environmental conflicts that are
still in progress. Considerable work has to be done to ensure that
infrastructure investments are executed in a way that helps communities.
All the above findings are well documented in mining sector conflicts.
However, a big gap remains in research about conflicts in other

infrastructure investments. The goal of this study is to provide meaningful
research findings on infrastructure project conflicts, as to improve planning
and mitigation strategies.

2. RESEARCH METHODS
This report followed a hybrid qualitative and quantitative research
approach. We merged the lessons learned from 32 interviews with
executives involved in conflict-affected infrastructure projects with the
information gathered from the 200-project database. The interviews
targeted a conclusive range of stakeholders, in order to have the most
comprehensive perspective on conflicts. People interviewed included
executives
of
construction
companies,
representatives
of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and research institutions, and
sustainability specialists. Interviews were conducted during June, July,
August, and September of 2016, involving groups of people from the same
company or individuals (Appendix J). In most cases, a set of predefined
questions was distributed in advance, in Spanish or English, in order to
frame the discussion (Appendix K).
Then, a database of 200 conflict-affected infrastructure projects was
created. The database included projects from the resource extraction,
energy, waste, water, transportation, and urban development
infrastructure sectors across 20 countries in the LAC region, as
represented in Figure 1 and listed in Appendix L. Projects were selected
from a wide range of sources. We performed a comprehensive literature
review and evaluated online databases such as the World Bank’s Private
Participation in Infrastructure [PPI] database, the Observatory of Mining
Conflicts in Latin America (Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América
Latina, OCMAL), the Latin-American Observatory of Environmental
Conflicts (Observatorio Latinoamericano de Conflictos Ambientales,
OLCA), and the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID).xv Furthermore, each of the interviewees, as
well as Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) experts, was asked to
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provide a number of suggestions. Projects known for the creation of
prominent conflicts in the past as well as in more recent years were
included to evaluate how the nature of such conflicts has changed over the
years. A case summary was created for each project, highlighting the
nature of the main conflicts reported in each specific project, the
consequences of the conflict for the infrastructure firms and national
governments, as well as the company's response in each case.
Then, we conducted multiple axial coding analysis on interview transcripts
and case narratives to identify emerging categories that capture and
explain infrastructure conflict nature and impacts, as well as company
responses to conflict. Our analysis and coding was informed by previous
work on the subject. Please see Appendix M for the coding terms. The final
steps of data preparation were the population of multiple spreadsheets of
the case and interview values per the coding items, where we based our
statistical analyses on the nature and consequence of conflicts. Please see
Appendix A for more elaboration on methodology, data sampling, and the
statistical significance of findings.

FIGURE 1. MAP DISPLAYING THE 200 PROJECTS PER COUNTRY AND PER
SECTOR.
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3. DATA
The 200 Project Database
The project database was developed to represent the diverse range of
infrastructure in LAC over the last 40 years. The database includes
projects from the waste, water, urban development, energy,
transportation, and resource extraction infrastructure sectors, across 20
countries (Figure 1 and Appendix L). It should be noted that urban
development projects usually include large-scale interventions in the city
that combine real estate development with modernizations and/or
renovations of public spaces and other infrastructure, e.g. old port areas
or neglected parks. The selection of countries includes LAC countries that
have had the highest rate of infrastructure and economic development,
such as Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, and Colombia, and those rich in
natural resources with high rates of urbanization and potential for
economic development, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. With the goal
of evaluating whether the nature of infrastructure conflicts has changed
over the years, the database includes projects developed from the 1980s
until today.
Recognizing the fact that LAC has gradually become the world’s most
urbanized region, the database includes projects developed in both rural
and urban settings with the purpose of evaluating whether rural and urban
environments lead to different types of conflict. Rural projects include
transmission lines, wind farms, resource extraction, and hydropower
projects, among others. Projects in urban settings include waste and
wastewater treatment plants, urban transportation such as Bus Rapid
Transit (BRT) and subways, ports, airports, and water treatment facilities.
Certain project types can be found in both rural and urban settings, such
as thermoelectric power plants, highways, and waste management
facilities.

such, projects were selected with the goal of representing as wide a range
of these variations as possible. For example, projects range from landfills
that accept 50,000 tons of Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) per year to ones
that accept 2 million tons of MSW, hydroelectric projects that cost from
US$70 million to US$4 billion, and transportation projects that serve
between 50,000 and 6.1 million people daily.
Figure 2 has a breakdown of all infrastructure sectors while Figure 3 shows
the subsectors within the resource, energy, and transportation sectors.
Figure 4 displays the number of projects per country in the database.

FIGURE 2. BREAKDOWN OF ALL SIX INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS.

The scale and cost of projects may differ significantly from country to
country, and even among different regions within the same country. As
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FIGURE 3. BREAKDOWN OF ENERGY, RESOURCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
SECTORS.

FIGURE 4. PROJECTS IN THE DATABASE PER COUNTRY.
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Interviews
32 interviews were conducted, targeted to the different agents involved in
the process of developing an infrastructure project. Interviewees included
executives of construction companies, operators, financiers,
representatives of NGOs and research institutions, and sustainability
specialists. Interviewees represented most countries in LAC but also
included select individuals from other countries. See Appendix J for a list
of individuals and companies included in the interviews. Figure 5
represents a breakdown of the interviewees per sector and per country.
Interviews were conducted during June, July, and August of 2016,
individually or in groups of people from the same company. A
semistructured questionnaire (Appendix K) was distributed to the
interviewees in advance, which they answered according to their
experience. All interviews were recorded, with the permission of the
interviewees, and then transcribed and codified for the analysis of
emergent findings.

Focus Group Validation of Results
The final step of our work was to share this study in a select group of senior
finance professionals, to review findings and results. The reviewers were
asked to start from a big-picture assessment, identify if the findings make
sense and if there was anything unexpected or missing. Following up on
any particular items identified in the review, reviewers were asked what
matters most to them as an investor, and how does their company mitigate
or deal with conflicts.
FIGURE 5. INTERVIEWEES PER COUNTRY AND POSITION.

10

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

4. FINDINGS
4.1. The Nature of Conflict is Multidimensional
The nature of conflicts is multidimensional, and more dynamic than is
considered in conventional project decision-making. Several drivers of
conflict are interrelated, and the emergence of one often causes a
cascading effect that influences more drivers and can even exacerbate
conflicts to violent confrontations. Overall, the evaluation of the project
database shows that most projects faced social and environmental
conflicts concurrently. The drivers of conflict were grouped in four
categories: environmental, social, governance, and economic.

Environmental Drivers of Conflict
Degradation of ecosystems (72% of cases) and pollution (67% of cases)
are the most prominent environmental conflict drivers in the database.
Furthermore, communities strongly oppose projects that they believe
might cause damage similar to the damage of comparable projects
elsewhere, even in other countries or continents. Our analysis shows that
28% of projects faced historically motivated community opposition.
"It is extremely difficult for a company to develop a project in an area where
there has been a conflictive project (e.g. mining). Even a different type of
project.” Senior executive at infrastructure operating company
Deforestation led to conflicts in 24% of cases. In most cases, communities
were concerned about the loss of natural capital. Water issues, especially
excess consumption or pollution of potable water, were a conflict driver in
17% of cases. Finally, climate change became an issue of debate in 11%
of cases. NGOs and independent scientists, in particular, opposed
projects that required the conversion of, or development within, worldrenowned natural ecosystems that help mitigate anthropogenic factors
that lead to climate change, such as wetlands protected by the Ramsar
Convention on Wetlands.xvi

Similar findings emerged in the interviews. 45% of interviewees reported
that a community historically opposed to certain infrastructure usually
includes three aspects. The first aspect is opposition against a certain
project typology; bad practices during the last decades in projects such as
hydropower or mining often affect the community’s perception about these
projects. Past environmental disasters, or the fear that such projects would
affect their livelihoods (e.g. risk of water contamination in a fishing area),
are common preconceived ideas that trigger conflicts. The second aspect
is opposition against development in a certain area; the approval of local
communities becomes complicated when projects are sited in areas where
previous projects have created an adverse effect, even if the new project
includes all necessary measures to avoid similar impacts. The third aspect
is opposition against a certain developer. Communities are likely to
oppose a specific company, especially when developing an area’s
ecological and cultural value is at stake. This opposition may come from
the distrust on the developer coming from past failures in other projects or
locations, an effect aggravated lately by social media. Opposition can also
be reinforced when a foreign developer faces distrust of local communities
that are in principle against international ownership of their infrastructure
and resources.
In cases facing historically motivated opposition, firms have to put added
effort so as to avoid conflicts based on past prejudices. One example is
the Cartagena Channel Dredging project in Colombia, where construction
was disrupted multiple times for reasons similar to the ones described
above. In this case, the team had to prove that the allegations against the
project were false in order to resume work. According to some figures
provided by the project team, the expected investment in community
engagement almost doubled from US$1.5 million to US$2.5 million due to
negotiations. Figure 6 summarizes the environmental conflict drivers for
all projects.
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development opportunities and those who opposed the project for its
impact on their traditional way of life.

FIGURE 6. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT, ALL
PROJECTS.

Social Drivers of Conflict
Lack of community benefits led to conflicts in 84% of cases. Communities
were concerned that they would have to endure the project’s negative
impacts without receiving adequate benefits as compensation. In large
infrastructure projects this becomes a complex challenge, as such projects
might affect ecosystems and communities’ tens of kilometers away.
Reduced access to resources led to conflicts in 78% of cases. In most
cases, local communities were concerned about losing access to
agricultural and marine resources they depend on for their livelihoods and
daily income.
Impacts on the traditional value system of local people (70% of cases) and
lack of local jobs (47% of cases) are prominent, often interrelated conflict
drivers. Many communities regard infrastructure as an opportunity for
economic development and demand a sizable portion of project-related
jobs to be allocated to them. However, some other communities oppose
large infrastructures and are afraid that such projects would alter their way
of life and degrade their traditions. In certain cases, a community was
divided between those who wanted the project for its economic

Forced relocation of people led to conflicts in 33% of cases. Especially in
countries with significant indigenous populations without legally protected
land rights, the land expropriation and relocation process remains a major
hurdle for firms. In many cases the relocation process initially did not seem
challenging, but later led to significant conflicts. In rural settings, for
instance, when planned in advance, relocation processes could be
implemented faster than in urban settings. It is easier to select from
alternatives or propose a different project route or location in rural projects,
as vacant parcels of land are more easily available.
61% of the interviewees reported that external groups with hidden political
or economic interests can disrupt the process of coming to an agreement.
In general, frustrating communities during the earliest phases can have a
significant effect on whether they would accept the project over the long
term, regardless of the project typology or the quality of the works. Another
major issue is unplanned migration. As a result of large developments, in
particular the creation of new job opportunities, groups of people move to
the project area to seek jobs or to occupy land in order to request
compensation as if they were long-time residents. This rent seeking
behavior becomes more and more frequent and makes it very difficult to
implement just and fair compensation schemes. The sudden inflation of
affected people in the region makes it much more costly to acquire the
land rights and manage the resettlements in a fair way.
“Conflict is a business.” Executive at infrastructure company
Technology issues led to conflicts in 18% of cases. Technology becomes
a social issue when user groups or affected communities do not
completely accept or understand the application of a new system or
solution that resolves a particular issue or impact in infrastructure. In these
cases, experts and regulators have vetted the new technology. However,
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it is the general public that a priori rejects it or does not use it during
operations. Urban transportation systems, landfills and thermoelectric
plants faced such issues. Abuse of labor rights led to conflicts in 15% of
cases. In these cases, workers complained about poor working conditions
and the lack of a risk management framework to enable them to work
safely. Last but not least, crime (11%) and prostitution (4%) are among the
social conflict drivers. These provided tensions between communities and
developers in isolated regions, where a project led to large inflows of
workers. Figure 7 displays the social drivers of conflict for all projects.

FIGURE 7. SUMMARY OF SOCIAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT, ALL PROJECTS.

Governance Drivers of Conflict
Deficient planning is the most dominant conflict driver in the governance
category and overall. Deficient planning aggravated conflicts in 86% of
cases in the database, and was reported by 74% of the interviewees as a
conflict driver. Planning includes project type and site selection, key
project technologies, and long-term strategies on how the region would
develop after the project. In many cases conflicts escalated because
government planning did not anticipate specific project impacts or did not
provide guidance for the implementation of infrastructure works.

Lack of adequate consultation (or just absence of consultation) led to
conflicts in 74% of cases. This was a particularly significant conflict driver
for populations which did not have the right to a formal consultation, or
have acquired such right only very recently. In fact, conflicts escalated in
almost 90% of cases involving indigenous peoples because potentially
affected communities were not consulted about the project. Even countries
that have enacted legislation to safeguard the rights of indigenous
populations often lack the institutional capacity to enforce these principles.
For example, Peru has enacted some of the most innovative laws to
safeguard the rights of indigenous populations. However, although it
ratified the ILO Convention 169 in 1994, it took more than 20 years before
these were applied for the first time in a Peruvian mining project. xvii
Lack of transparency in project-related information and the decisionmaking process led to conflicts in 68% of cases. The rights of local
communities to access such information are increasingly supported by
national laws throughout LAC. In spite of this, unwillingness of firms and
governments to provide such information has increasingly led to conflicts,
Corruption led to conflicts in 34% of cases. Corruption was often related
to the transparency driver, as corruption allegations were preceded by lack
of transparency and willingness to share project information.
55% of the interviewees also reported unrealistic expectations as a
common conflict driver. These include (i) high expectations from the
community, and/or (ii) high expectations from the government. Local
communities are exposed to a wide variety of agents, ranging from
government officials, international organizations and NGOs to company
representatives. Lack of a single voice and a clear line of communication
with the community, combined with lack of basic services in certain areas
puts additional pressure on the developer. Local communities expect –in
some cases due to political promises– that many different infrastructure
services will be provided by the developer. These expectations are likely
to generate frustration and discontent in the population, and in the worst
case, project delays or cancellations.
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Previous bad reputation led to conflicts in 14% of cases, with past actions
of firms or the negative impacts of past projects aggravating conflicts.
Insufficient local participation in the project company (8% of cases) is also
a conflict driver. Communities increasingly demand to be included in the
entities responsible for managing operations as well as those managing
social engagement initiatives. Figure 8 displays the governance drivers of
conflict for all projects.

and that the infrastructure service (such as provision of energy or water)
cost its users too much. These issues are particularly prominent in urban
transportation and water projects in the database. Many BRT and subway
projects were delayed because of such conflicts, whereas many water
privatizations failed because people considered access to water to be a
right and not a service that can be priced as high as the full cost of
processing and transporting the water.
Wage disputes led to conflicts in 14% of cases. Well-organized unions
were effective in demanding better wages and additional benefits for
workers, many times disrupting project activities leading to multiple indirect
negative consequences such as delays and cost overruns in highly
populated urban centers. Figure 9 displays the economic drivers of conflict
for all projects. Figure 10 on the next page summarizes the interviewee
responses on the nature of conflicts.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that sometimes a competitor may be behind
the emergence of a conflict, with the ultimate goal to stop an infrastructure
project. However, our case research did not identify such claims in
published sources or statements.

FIGURE 8. SUMMARY OF GOVERNANCE DRIVERS OF CONFLICT, ALL PROJECTS.

Economic Drivers of Conflict
In 38% of cases conflicts escalated because the government did not
implement the works it had agreed to in the project agreement. Such works
might include the construction of specific project components,
development of new institutions, or providing community engagement
initiatives. Unjust profit distribution led to conflicts in 24% of cases. In these
cases, local communities and governments complained about project
profits being distributed to more urbanized regions.
The price of infrastructure service (27% of cases) and excessive profit
level (13% of cases) are also common economic drivers of conflict. Local
communities and stakeholders often alleged that projects were overpriced

“A competitor blocking a project nearby through environmental or social
claims is the elephant in the room. Everyone in the industry knows it can
happen, but no one talks about it.” Executive at finance company

FIGURE 9. SUMMARY OF ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF CONFLICT, ALL PROJECTS.

14

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

4.2. Conflicts Cause Projects to Fail and Harm National
Economies
The consequences of conflicts range from delays and cost overruns to
project cancellations. They entail non-technical risks and time and budget
overruns that can damage the business case and the operational model
of infrastructure firms heavily, yet such impacts are regularly
underestimated or not considered at all.
The potential for unexpected impacts increases rapidly when developing
projects in urban centers. Disruptions in urban environments may delay
project activities in multiple ways and cause a cascading effect,
introducing more delays and overruns. The potential for project activities
to unexpectedly affect nearby communities is also far greater in the city.
FIGURE 10. INTERVIEWEE RESPONSES ON THE NATURE OF CONFLICT.

Conflict Escalation
The next step of our analysis was to evaluate how conflicts escalate. We
found that conflicts usually escalate in a similar manner. Opponents start
with press statements (100% of cases) and administrative complaints
(96% of cases). If these are not successful in resolving the issue, protests
(90% of cases) and blockades (51% of cases) come along, followed by
litigation (63% of cases) and arbitration (10% of cases). Projects when
operational can also be boycotted (7% of cases).

Project delays (81% of cases) and cost overruns (58% of cases) were the
most common conflict consequences at the project level. The average
delay from all projects listed in the available literature is approximately 5
years. Similarly, the average publicly reported cost overrun from all
projects that faced cost overruns is US$1,170 million, or 69.2% of average
original budget.
It should be noted that our research identified delays or cost overruns only
in cases where these were quantified in a source. It is highly likely that

In cases of very conflictive projects, protests and blockades have
escalated to violent confrontations (29% of cases), leading to injuries (24%
of cases), and damage to property (18% of cases). In the most extreme
cases, confrontations have resulted in loss of human life (15% of cases).
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many more, if not all, projects had delays and cost overruns that were not
quantified or mentioned in publicly available sources.

the most common impacts on projects from conflicts. Figure 11
summarizes the impacts of conflict at the project level, for all projects.

“THE BUDGET ASSOCIATED WITH LOGISTICS DOUBLED DUE TO BLOCKADES. THE
ADDITIONAL MONITORING REQUIRED IN THE PROJECT WAS NOT FORESEEN… THE
INDIRECT COSTS, SUCH AS DAMAGE TO VEHICLES OR RESOURCES HAVE NOT
BEEN ESTIMATED TO DATE.” COUNTRY MANAGER AT INFRASTRUCTURE HOLDING
COMPANY.
An independent expert review to help ameliorate or explain the conflict
was observed in 57% of cases. Both developers and project opponents
asked for expert reviews. The consequences of such reviews can be
negative in terms of bad press coverage and modifications if the experts
highlight any mistakes, but also positive if the experts conclude that the
developer had done nothing wrong.
Project redesign (42% of cases) is also a prominent conflict consequence
in the database. Such modifications create high additional costs for the
project, while they also come with delays, as some project activities have
to be postponed in order for the firm to implement the modifications. In
many cases where a project redesign was required, independent experts
evaluated the updated proposal as a much better alternative. This creates
a strong link between the deficient planning driver and the request for
redesign.
In most cases where a project redesign was required, experts argued that
conflicts could have been avoided had the government and the developer
agreed to develop the project in another location or in a way that
incorporated community concerns into the design. This also applies to the
project relocation consequence, which was observed in 7% of cases. A
change in joint venture participants was observed in 13% of cases. Finally,
18% of projects were cancelled outright because of conflicts. The
interviewees reported project delays (48%) and cost overruns (39%) as

FIGURE 11. SUMMARY OF CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT AT THE PROJECT
LEVEL, ALL PROJECTS.
Conflicts may also result in legal and administrative impacts. Reputational
damage was observed in 95% of cases. Impaired reputation affects
credibility and can harm investors and developers while developing similar
projects in the future, as evidenced by the importance of the historically
motivated opposition and previous bad reputation conflict drivers. In many
cases, a newspaper or online article alleging that the infrastructure firm
has violated or is ready to violate the law is enough to intensify conflicts.
Nowadays, communities have ample access to information. Social media
enable them to mobilize and demonstrate their opposition to projects
rapidly in ways unheard of in past decades. NGOs are also able to easily
organize online campaigns against projects that quickly attract
international attention.
Redress payments and fines were observed in 30% and 20% of cases,
respectively. Fines and redress payments were often a result of violations
of environmental and consultation law and failures to conduct necessary
environmental impact studies. Finally, amendment of the concession and
imprisonment were penalties observed in 27% and 5% of cases,
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respectively. The imprisonment consequence was directly linked with fines
in many cases, as it was imposed due to contract irregularities and
corruption. 42% of the interviewees reported that reputational damage is
usually among the most significant consequences of conflict for
companies. Figure 12 summarizes the administrative and legal
consequences of conflict.

FIGURE 12. SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CONFLICT FOR PROJECT SPONSORS, ALL PROJECTS.

Loss of productivity (22% of cases) and lack of development (20% of
cases) were the most frequent consequences of conflict at the national
level. Most projects in the database had general development and growth
as a key objective. When projects are delayed or cancelled, these benefits
often do not materialize. Loss of foreign investment (17% of cases) was
an equally important consequence, as many of the regions traditionally
lack investments in infrastructure and public services. Change of
government was observed in 2% of cases. Conflicts also resulted in
political damages that weakened governments. In some cases, the
opposition gained a political advantage for upcoming elections through
conflictive projects.
Interviewees reported loss of productivity (19%), lack of development
(13%), and loss of foreign investment (13%) as frequent national
consequences of conflict. Figure 13 displays the national consequences
for all projects in the database. Figure 14 summarizes the responses of
the interviewees on the consequences of conflicts, across all categories.

In many cases, conflicts were detrimental to the country’s economy in
terms of forgone royalties and lost development opportunities from
cancelled projects, losses that might be felt in its economy for decades.
Conflicts might also escalate to the point where presidents resign and
government administrations change, or might result in considerable
political damage that facilitates such a change in the immediate future.
“The consequences of conflicts are diverse. The most important are lack
of confidence for investment, lack of legal certainty, lack of confidence in
the work done by institutions, unaccountable governments, and instability
during the development process... For domestic and international
investors, this is a bad message that creates uncertainty and discourages
investment.” Division head at infrastructure operating company

FIGURE 13. SUMMARY OF NATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT, ALL
PROJECTS.
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resulted in environmental and social impacts, firms in general
demonstrated a willingness to address and evaluate the case. When the
conflict was about the lack of compliance with environmental law,
consultation requirements, or community benefits, evaluating the
response of the company became increasingly complex.

FIGURE 14. INTERVIEWEE RESPONSES ON CONFLICT CONSEQUENCES.

4.3. Conflicts Are Not Addressed Systematically
Our analysis shows that many firms spend a lot of time and effort in
addressing conflicts. However, several interviewees mentioned that some
firms are hesitant to invest upfront and address conflicts in advance. In
86% of cases firms took action to address conflicts, but in 14% of cases
firms remained unresponsive to conflicts. The specific circumstances of
whether and how companies decide to address a conflict differ, but the
overarching strategies can be grouped in three categories: general
company actions, provision of community benefits, and provision of
environmental benefits.

General Company Actions
In 91% of cases, firms addressed conflicts merely with press statements.
Such statements expressed various opinions on why the conflicts had
escalated, and whether the firms developing the projects were responsible
for such conflicts. In cases where projects clearly indirectly or directly

In most cases the national government is responsible for ensuring
compliance with such laws, while in some cases such laws did not exist in
the country in question. Firms often argued that they complied with all
relevant laws as required by the environmental impact assessment (EIA)
process. In cases where the EIA process was deficient, most firms did
demonstrate a willingness to implement necessary modifications.
Furthermore, executives stated that political groups take advantage of
local communities to promote their interests and gain political advantage
by fueling conflicts.
Although lack of adequate consultation or no consultation is a major
conflict driver, many firms did not demonstrate a willingness to consult with
communities once conflicts escalated. In 69% of cases firms did conduct
a consultation process as a response, but often a lot of damage had
already been done in terms of delays and cost overruns.
The interviewees reported that the requirements for consultation vary
according to the country under analysis. In most cases, the government is
responsible for conducting consultation. But due to lack of expertise or
resources, governments often delegate the responsibility to the developer.
According to experts in conflict resolution, unrealistic project timelines
often derail the consultation process. Contractual agreements or political
agendas accelerate the timeframe for the completion of projects, leaving
insufficient time for engaging stakeholders.
“There is a big gap between the recognition of the particular set of skills to
facilitate stakeholder engagement and the BAU process of companies
rushing through it to get permits.” Research scholar & conflict expert.
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Furthermore, communities regard the issue of transparency as more
critical than many firms do. Although firms may begin the community
engagement process with best intentions in mind, lack of transparency and
capacity to follow consultation good practices leads to conflicts.
“People who are in charge of negotiations with the communities often
choose the approach of ‘transfer of resources’ (monetary transaction)
rather than assessing their real needs. It would be much more efficient to
identify their needs, and provide training and investments to create a
sense of ownership.” Sustainability practice leader at multinational
consulting company
Around 60% of the interviewees acknowledged the importance of a conflict
management framework as a strategy to minimize conflicts. However, just
one interviewee reported such a system beyond a conventional social
responsibility plan.
“[Conflict management] looks like a purely transactional issue by applying
legal solutions instead of trying to gain the trust of people.” Division head
at extractive company
The involvement of independent experts to provide an objective evaluation
on ongoing conflicts was effective in dealing with conflicts in 39% of cases.
Most project opponents in such cases did regard a third-party intervention
as objective and meaningful, especially when experts were members of
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) or reputable international
organizations. Independent experts stated that some firms are aware of
the consequences of conflict but are not always aware of community
engagement and consultation good practices.
“Governments are starting to understand (e.g. Peru) that conventional
assessment processes relying on a single consultant to do a variety of
analyses are not robust enough. You need many people with different
areas of expertise, that are experts on local communities, have good
manners, and speak the local language, as opposed to having technocrats

that speak with facts local people do not understand. Stakeholder
engagement is a skill, not something that everyone can do easily.”
Research scholar & conflict expert.
Regulatory compliance was observed as a response in 46% of cases.
However, the interviewees reported that complying with regulatory
requirements is not enough to minimize conflicts.
"Complying with regulations in an effective manner usually represents
about 20% of the total effort and commitment that our projects require to
be on track." Division head at extractive company
In 16% of cases, infrastructure firms implemented initiatives that exceeded
local regulatory requirements to manage conflicts. These initiatives range
from conducting consultation when national law does not mandate it and
directly involving communities during construction or operations, to
implementing socio-environmental initiatives at unprecedented scale and
working with government to update conflicting regulations. These actions
usually required a significant amount of time and resources. For example,
community engagement often included negotiation roundtables to decide
on additional environmental and social initiatives over many months. In
some cases, firms negotiated with communities over five to ten years to
move the project forward.
Force was observed as a company response in 12% of cases. Such a
response almost invariably resulted in negative consequences. Most firms
used security forces not as a means to violently repress protests but to
safeguard their properties, as conflicts often escalate to property damages
within the project site. In some extreme cases, when conflicts escalated
rapidly and community protests could not be contained, the government
ordered police and army forces to violently break up protests.
Then, in 19% of cases, firms decided that abandoning the project would
be their better option. In particular, in 3% of cases firms had to file for
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bankruptcy as a response to ongoing conflicts. In these cases, firms had
already suffered a substantial amount of economic damage because of
conflicts.
Finally, in 14% of cases firms took no action to avoid or address conflicts.
In fact, some infrastructure firm executives have stated that mitigating
conflicts in advance is often more time-consuming and expensive than
dealing with potential issues as they arise.
“In our country, there is the notion that it is cheaper to go ahead without
defining comprehensive measures and pay the price afterwards in terms
of compensation and dealing with conflicts. Just making the business run
and then dealing with the consequences is considered to be the most
efficient way to do things.” Executive at environmental NGO
Most interviewees reported the use of a risk and conflict management
framework (58%) and regulatory innovation (45%) as effective responses
in dealing with conflicts. 32% of the interviewees reported that they usually
try to have local representatives assess disagreements. Representatives
in some cases are trained in conflict resolution, and try to manage conflicts
before they escalate to more serious levels. 31% of the interviewees
reported that companies often remain unresponsive to conflicts. Figure 15
summarizes the general company actions for all projects in the database.
Figure 16 displays the interviewee responses on general company
actions. Please see Appendix F for an overview on company responses
to conflicts throughout the period of our research.

FIGURE 15. SUMMARY OF GENERAL COMPANY ACTIONS, ALL PROJECTS.

FIGURE 16. INTERVIEWEE RESPONSES ON GENERAL COMPANY ACTIONS.
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Provision of Community Benefits
Many firms provided investments in community infrastructure (47% of
cases), capacity-building (42% of cases), jobs (39% of cases), and
community cash payments (27% of cases). The interviewees reported that
capacity-building initiatives may be targeted to leaders, members or both.
In cases where communities request infrastructure and services that are
normally provided by the government, firms provide technical support so
communities can file formal requests to the government.
Capacity-building initiatives are also increasingly managed through the
creation of a sustainable development fund to promote development in the
area and provide education opportunities. According to several
interviewees, providing cash payments through the renegotiation of
agreements is a prominent response to conflicts. In this process, there are
different aspects to be considered; first, the source of such payments, and
then the effectiveness of that approach. When the project is private,
developers can easily decide how to invest their capital. However, when
the project is public, the capacity to renegotiate agreements is limited.
Such benefits are usually enough to satisfy the demands of communities
in remote rural regions that have historically lacked such initiatives.
However, when projects are implemented in more developed and
urbanized regions, communities increasingly demand benefits that far
exceed the basic provision of jobs and infrastructure.
In such cases, firms responded by involving communities in the project
(11% of cases) through enhanced capacity-building initiatives. These
enabled community members to acquire skills necessary to be employed
by the firm during operations or to participate in various other project
activities during construction. This was evident when waste management
projects required the closure of landfills and waste-pickers were faced with
losing their jobs.

In 1% of cases communities demanded an equity stake in the project to
ensure that they would receive adequate benefits throughout operations.
Similarly, in 5% of cases firms responded by increasing the government’s
equity stake. Figure 17 summarizes the community benefits as a response
to conflict for all projects.

FIGURE 17. SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY BENEFITS, ALL PROJECTS.
The interviewees reported community infrastructure (42%) and community
project participation (35%) as the most common community benefits.
Figure 18 on the next page summarizes the interviewee responses on
community benefits as a response to conflict.

FIGURE 18. INTERVIEWEE RESPONSES ON COMMUNITY BENEFITS
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Provision of Environmental Benefits
Most firms implemented environmental improvement initiatives (32% of
cases) to enhance natural environments, often covering hundreds of
hectares. In 14% of cases, firms implemented environmental restoration
initiatives to restore polluted and degraded natural environments. Finally,
reforestation initiatives were identified in 11% of cases. Figure 19
summarizes the environmental benefits as a response to conflict for all
projects.

FIGURE 20. CONFLICT ESCALATION PER SECTOR, ALL PROJECTS.
We also evaluated whether conflicts in specific sectors result in more
severe consequences. Figure 21 on the next page shows that conflicts in
the resource, energy, and waste sectors on average led to more severe
consequences. Conflicts in the urban development sector led to the least
severe consequences. Please see Appendix G for more information on
the conflict consequence point system.
FIGURE 19. SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS, ALL PROJECTS.

4.4. Conflicts Affect Each Infrastructure Sector Differently
In general, although all six infrastructure sectors have seen conflicts,
resource, transportation, and energy projects have been more conflictive.
As shown in Figure 20, a higher percentage of conflicts escalated to high
and extreme levels in projects within these three sectors. Please see
Appendix C for an overview on conflict drivers per sector, and Appendix G
for more information on conflict escalation levels and the conflict
escalation point system.

Similarly, the average company response to conflicts differs considerably
from sector to sector. Although higher-ranking responses to conflicts were
observed from firms within all six infrastructure sectors, more
comprehensive responses are observed in more conflictive sectors.
Figure 22 shows that the average company response of firms developing
resource, energy, and waste projects ranks higher in terms of our
indicator. Water and urban development projects, which led to the least
significant conflicts, had the lowest-ranking conflict responses. Please see
Appendix G for more information on the company response to conflict
point system.
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4.5. Projects Are Vulnerable to Conflicts Early On
Conflicts can arise or escalate during all phases of a project’s life cycle.
However, our analysis shows that projects face more conflicts during the
earliest phases (Figure 23). In fact, multiple projects included in the
database faced conflicts as early as when they were announced. Several
interviewees mentioned that project opponents endeavor to disrupt project
activities during the early phases and before the start of construction,
because then the project is easier to modify or even stop.

FIGURE 21. CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT PER INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR.

FIGURE 23. TIMING OF CONFLICT IN PROJECT CYCLE, ALL PROJECTS.

FIGURE 22. COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICT PER INFRASTRUCTURE SECTOR.

About half of the interviewees (49%) identified the construction phase as
the most likely to see conflict, while 32% reported that conflicts arise early
on during planning, 3% reported conflicts in operations and 7% in project
closure. Around 30% stated that conflicts can occur in multiple phases.
According to several company representatives, the first eight to ten
months of the construction process is the riskiest period, though this period
can vary according to project type and scale. Project owners reported that
lack of a robust regulatory framework, inconsistencies in the licensing
process, unclear land ownership status, or disagreement regarding the
compensation process led to conflicts early on. Figure 24 shows the
interviewee responses on when conflicts are likely to occur.
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“In hydroelectric projects, conflicts occur during pre-feasibility because of
community concerns and expectations. Then during construction. In a few
cases conflicts also occurred during operations. [...] In mining projects,
conflicts usually occur during operations, as communities begin to
perceive negative effects, for example: pollution, excessive water use,
hazardous waste.” Division head at infrastructure operating company

communities are legally recognized requirements in multiple LAC
countries today. xviii Please see Appendix D for an overview on the
influence of conflict drivers throughout the period of our research.

FIGURE 25. TIMING OF CONFLICT IN PROJECT CYCLE
PER DECADE, 1980 – TODAY.

FIGURE 24. INTERVIEWEE RESPONSES ON THE TIMING OF CONFLICT IN PROJECT
CYCLE.
The point of time in the project cycle at which conflicts emerge has shifted
over the last decades. As is shown in Figure 25 on the next page, projects
developed until the 1990s faced most conflicts during the later project
phases. More recent projects have faced conflicts earlier in the project
cycle. This might be partly explained by the fact that communities did not
always have the explicit right to be informed about projects in advance.
In some older cases, communities learned that a project would be
developed within their premises when construction started. In fact, these
older projects made countries and organizations adopt better standards.
For instance, although not a necessity 20 years ago, access to projectrelated information and the free, prior, and informed consent of

Through the 200-project case literature review and the interviews we
observed that conflicts during the earliest phases result in more severe
consequences. When conflicts arise during the earliest project phases,
cost overruns, and project cancellations are more frequent. Delayed but
still in progress projects show similar trends. Projects that are operational,
however, faced conflicts later in the project cycle. Please see Appendix E
for a graph displaying the relationship between the timing of conflict in
project cycle and final project status.
We also found suggestive evidence that more recent projects in the
database that faced most conflicts early in the project cycle also faced
more severe consequences of conflicts. Overall, projects developed
during the 1980s did face conflicts with substantial consequences, but at
that time safeguards for communities and accountability mechanisms for
developers had not yet been implemented. Thus, delays, modifications,
redesigns, project cancellations, and loss of foreign investment were not
as common in older projects in the database. Our conflict consequence
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analysis showed that projects developed in the 1980s on average faced
milder consequences than projects developed in the 1990s and 2000s.
However, more research is needed to clarify if this is a trend.

4.6. Lack of Upstream Planning Is a Dominant Driver of
Conflict
Deficient planning is the most dominant conflict driver. The location of
projects, in particular, is a factor that can lead to widespread conflicts.
Several interviewees pointed out the risk of deficient upstream planning
which prevents the selection of better project sites and often hinders a
long-term stable and sustainable development of a region. Projects are
sited within pristine natural environments even when the law forbids this,
or are planned around a region that has seen many conflictive projects.
Unclear land rights exacerbate disputes about the significant land use
change infrastructure projects entail and can lead to conflicts. If there are
upstream plans which guide the siting of projects then they usually do not
properly account for the significance of conflicts that can arise during the
land expropriation process, as indigenous peoples have unclear land
ownership rights to a substantial percentage of land in the LAC region.
Furthermore, the lack of such long-term planning of successive
governments has left some regions rich in natural resources without
adequate investments. Communities in these regions often constitute the
country’s poorest segments. As such, disrupting projects is regarded as
an opportunity to mandate long-overdue investments in infrastructure and
public services that were promised but that never materialized.
“Companies have the incentive to make sure that their projects are not
going to create protests that result in cost overruns. But they do not have
the incentive to do this early landscape level planning, which appears to
be a government responsibility. It is a bit of a conundrum. Companies do
not have the incentive for planning at that scale but have the finances to
do it. Governments have the incentive for planning at that scale, as it is
their responsibility, their national and cultural heritage and social

commitment to the population, but they do not have the funding for it.”
Senior executive at environmental NGO.
Community concerns, combined with a history of conflict and inequality in
the region, were often inadequately handled or plainly ignored, increasing
the likelihood of protests and disruptions. Existing unresolved grievances
perpetuated an environment of mistrust, hindered communication, and
diluted collaboration. In addition, issues such as the need to relocate
people that were not part of the decision-making process often led to
community protests. The cumulative impacts from developing many
projects within a short distance and in regions that have not seen such
developments before are rarely taken into consideration. In cases of
multiple small projects happening in the same region, the impacts at the
project level were insignificant but the cumulative impacts from all the
projects weren’t adequately considered and led to community opposition.
In our quantitative analysis, we found suggestive evidence for a
relationship between large-scale projects and increased conflict severity.
Please see Appendix I for an overview of our analysis.
“The underlying dynamic of every conflict we observed was that before the
incidents there already was a history of underlying tensions and lack of
trust between communities, government, and developers. They altogether
exacerbated and escalated individual events to widespread conflicts. It’s
not that something went wrong unexpectedly and communities erupted
without reason.” Research scholar & conflict expert
The impacts of deficient planning can be illustrated by national priority
projects. Governments often promote infrastructure projects as being of
national interest, often as part of political campaigns during election
periods. Because of the expectations arising from such projects in terms
of jobs, benefits for local communities, and investments in public services,
they become more controversial. Especially in cases where firms and
governments are not able to implement the promised initiatives because
of economic or political issues, national priority projects lead to intense
conflicts.
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Through the project case literature review we observed that in some
national priority cases in the database, authorities approved site selections
and EIAs that may not have been in full compliance with national laws and
regulations. In many cases, governments also disregarded community
concerns and opposition in order to move the project forward as fast as
possible. Although these projects were promoted as a significant
opportunity for development, a common perception seems to exist among
communities that they will not receive enough benefits from such projects.
In most cases, government authorities did not manage to adequately
explain how communities and stakeholders would benefit beyond the
provision of jobs.
“All projects in the Amazon region started with the promise of
development, so we are interested in understanding how can we provide
local development through infrastructure projects. ... This is a strategy for
development in Brazil and Latin America, but what we are seeing is that
projects are not facilitating regional development.” Executive at
environmental NGO
To further evaluate the impacts of deficient planning in national priority
projects, we calculated the conflict escalation, conflict consequence, and
company response points for all national priority projects. We then
compared the national priority project scores with the scores of the nonpriority projects in the database. We found that national priority projects
led to slightly more severe conflicts, but the major impact can be seen in
conflict consequences and company response. Conflicts in national
priority projects on average result in more severe consequences (Figure
26).

FIGURE 26. CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT, NON-PRIORITY AND NATIONAL
PRIORITY PROJECTS.
SD(NON-PRIORITY) =11.6, SD (NATIONAL PRIORITY) = 14.6,
T-STATISTIC (2) =1.95, P-VALUE=0.05.
Similarly, the average company response score for national priority
projects is lower than the average response score for the remaining
projects in the database. In other words, national priority projects are less
likely to be prepared to address conflicts effectively (Figure 27).
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indicators working as a meta indicator, which we named composite
development indicator.

FIGURE 27. COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICT, NON-PRIORITY AND NATIONAL
PRIORITY PROJECTS.
SD(NON-PRIORITY) = 30, SD (NATIONAL PRIORITY) = 22.91, T-STATISTIC
(2) =1.64, P-VALUE=0.1.

4.7. The Institutional Capacity of Countries is Important to
Contain a Conflict
One prominent hypothesis is that conflicts tend to escalate to violent
confrontations more easily and result in substantial consequences more
often in countries that lack the institutional capacity to manage them
effectively. To test this relationship, we used various indicators that reflect
a country’s institutional capacity. These were the World Justice Project’s
Rule of Law Index, GDP per capita, the Human Development Index (HDI),
the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, and the World
Resource Institute’s Environmental Democracy Index. The indicator that
provided the most significant results is the Rule of Law Index xix, which we
present here, and in Appendix H you can find the results of all the

FIGURE 28. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND CONFLICT ESCALATION.
R= 47%, R2= 21%, P-VALUE = 0.056.
We reviewed the indicator score for each country represented in our
database and ranked them accordingly. Then we compared the Rule of
Law indicator with the severity of conflict escalation in each country. The
most severe conflicts were observed in countries with the lowest Rule of
Law indicator ranks (Figure 28). Therefore, there is a correlation between
countries with lower institutional capacity and governance, and the
magnitude of conflict expressions. In more just and equitable societies
where transparency, access to justice, and community participation are
ensured and laws are adequate and enforced, local communities are less
likely to resort to violence and disrupt projects. In countries with higher
levels of institutional development, more stringent environmental and
social management laws and requirements for participatory project
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designs encourage firms to proactively address community concerns and
resolve conflicts through communication and collaboration.
In some of these countries the rights of communities are not legally
protected, and environmental and consultation laws do not always apply
equally to projects promoted as being of national interest. In these
situations, communities feel that their concerns would not be heard
through the conventional decision-making process and decide to disrupt
project activities. This leads to different consequences depending on the
country. Some countries regard the right of communities to protest as a
fundamental right that should always be protected, while some others
have a historical tendency of violently repressing protests.xx
However, even countries that have enacted innovative environmental and
consultation laws, such as Peru and Brazil, often lack the institutional
capacity to effectively enforce them. This inevitably leads to the same
outcomes as in countries without such legal frameworks, making the case
for institutional development region-wide.

“In our country the institutional framework works, so most people would
file a legal claim. People do not usually take justice into their own hands.
Therefore, violence is not as common as in other places with weaker
institutions.” C-level officer at utility company
We further evaluated this relationship to identify whether the
consequences of conflicts are more significant in countries with lesser
institutional capacities. We calculated the average magnitude of
consequences in each country and compared it with each country’s rank
in the Rule of Law indicator. As shown in Figure 29, a positive correlation
exists between the countries with lower institutional capacity, as measured
by the Rule of Law indicator, and more significant consequences of
conflicts.
We also evaluated whether companies respond to conflicts differently in
these countries. We calculated the average company response point
score in each country and compared it with each country’s rank in the Rule
of Law indicator. As shown in Figure 30, we found suggestive evidence
that a correlation exists between countries with higher institutional capacity
as measured by the development indicator and more adequate responses
to conflicts. In other words, in countries with stronger institutional
capacities, infrastructure projects have less severe conflicts and their
sponsors respond more effectively when these conflicts emerge.
However, more research is needed to delve into the mechanics of this
relationship.

FIGURE 29. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT.
R = 50%, R2= 25%, P-VALUE= 0.048.
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cost overruns, and cancellations are common consequences of conflict in
the database. On the other hand, developers and governments can reap
benefits by planning sustainable projects in order to mitigate or avoid
conflicts in terms of avoided delays and other negative consequences.
Yet several interviewees mentioned that some infrastructure firms chose
to remain unresponsive to conflicts. In these cases, executives consider
the cost of anticipating and preventing conflicts to be greater than moving
ahead fast and dealing with each issue if and when it arises. Similar
findings were observed in the 200-project database, in which many firms
did not act to prevent conflicts or mitigate them as they started escalating.

FIGURE 30. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICT.
R =28%, R2 = 7.7%, P-VALUE = 0.2.
It is important to note that conflictive projects can also force institutions to
adapt. In some cases, conflicts resulted in positive institutional
developments, such as the implementation of mandatory consultation
laws that had existed only on paper before, and stricter environmental and
social safeguards. Some conflictive projects also stressed the importance
of independent arbitration, leading to the development of independent
arbitration and dispute resolution mechanisms such as the World Bank’s
Office of the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO). Especially in
transportation projects, conflicts often led to design changes that produced
more sustainable designs. In some other cases, conflictive projects acted
as deterrents for the future, providing examples of what firms need to avoid
in order to develop more sustainable projects in the future.

In order to evaluate the impact of a well-planned and comprehensive
response to conflict, we tested the relationship between company actions
and final project status. As illustrated in Figure 31, there is a positive
correlation between projects that are better prepared to address conflicts
and less significant conflict consequences, as measured by our indicator.
The average company response score is much lower in projects that were
cancelled or postponed because of conflicts.

4.8. Sustainable Planning Can Mitigate Conflicts
Our analysis suggests that the cost of conflict is likely to be greater than is
conceived by both governments and firms. Project disruptions, delays,
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High-quality projects can generate long-lasting benefits, and are more
attractive to public and private stakeholders. Furthermore, well-planned
and executed projects address conflicts proactively, minimize risks and
are less likely to face resistance because of environmental or social
concerns.

two to five years. It is much higher than the score of projects that faced
delays of five to ten years or more than ten years.

“We follow the policy of good neighbors through permanent dialogue,
building long-term relationships, and programs generating shared value.”
Division head at infrastructure operating company

FIGURE 32. COMPANY RESPONSE AND PROJECT DELAYS, ALL PROJECTS.

FIGURE 31. COMPANY RESPONSE AND FINAL PROJECT STATUS, ALL PROJECTS.
A HIGHER SCORE EQUALS BETTER PREPARATION, HIGHEST POSSIBLE SCORE IS
128 POINTS.
This relationship is particularly evident when comparing the average
company response and project delays. Figure 32 on the next page shows
that the average company response score for projects that faced delays
of up to two years is higher than the score for those that faced delays of

Through the 200-project case literature review and the interviews we
observed that certain firms have improved their responses to conflicts
through sustainability initiatives and exceed regulatory requirements for
community engagement and environmental management. Firms
developing projects in the resource, waste, and energy infrastructure
sectors often implement the most innovative strategies. Those sectors
lead to considerable conflicts; therefore, it was almost a necessity for
certain firms to innovate and respond to conflicts in ways different from
business as usual. Several interviewees mentioned that when firms are
not willing to implement comprehensive sustainability initiatives they face
a higher likelihood of project disruptions and cancellations.
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A prominent observation from the interviews and the project case literature
review is that infrastructure firms may provide social and environmental
benefits by investing in capacity building, infrastructure, and public
services in terms of budget and scale that often far exceed those of 20
years ago. The provision of jobs is no longer the most important benefit
communities are asking for, while technological advancements have also
reduced the number of jobs even a megaproject can provide. Innovative
firms often devote a substantive budget to social sustainability programs.
In addition, they have implemented regulatory innovations that allow local
communities to participate in the project decision-making process, and be
actively involved with project activities during construction and operations.
For example, communities and firms may collaboratively conduct water
sampling.

infrastructure, capacity building, environmental improvement, and
consultation initiatives are much less prominent in projects that were
cancelled or postponed because of conflicts. Other actions did not have
as evident effects.

Another important observation is that certain firms now demonstrate their
commitment to sustainability by restoring polluted natural ecosystems
within the project’s area of influence. Firms are willing to spend millions of
dollars on environmental restoration and reforestation initiatives over
hundreds of hectares of natural space. In all of these cases, national
regulations and law did not require such initiatives. Therefore, these
projects became good-case examples to be utilized by other infrastructure
firms thereafter.
In order to identify what are the most effective company responses to
conflict, we tested the various actions companies took after a conflict has
emerged against the end result of a project. Of course, the most
successful company actions can be evidenced in projects that did not
encounter a conflict. However, our research does not include those
projects from its original conception stage. In projects though that did have
a conflict, we found a difference between actions in terms of the end result
in a project. Figure 33 on the next page shows that there is a relationship
between firms that did respond to conflicts with community infrastructure
improvements or provision, community capacity building, environmental
improvements, and consultation, and final project status. Community
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FIGURE 33. THE IMPACT OF VARIOUS COMPANY RESPONSES TO CONFLICT
AGAINST THE FINAL PROJECT STATUS. CLOCKWISE, FROM TOP LEFT:
COMMUNITY
INFRASTRUCTURE
IMPROVEMENTS;
ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENTS; CAPACITY-BUILDING INITIATIVES; CONSULTATION. IN EACH
GRAPH, THE VERTICAL AXIS SHOWS THE PERCENT OF TOTAL PROJECTS THAT
TOOK THE SPECIFIC ACTION AS A RESPONSE TO CONFLICT AND THE HORIZONTAL
ACTION THE END RESULT OF THE PROJECT.
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4.9. A System for Conflict Identification, Management and
Resolution Will Provide Value to Companies
Around 60% of the interviewees reported that conflict management
frameworks are effective in mitigating project disruptions. Yet, they also
stated that most firms lack a comprehensive framework to assess and
identify potential conflicts in advance, hinting that companies view the cost
of designing and implementing such systems as higher than just paying
for the cost of conflict if and when it emerges. Several interviewees
stressed that especially in projects without the support of an IFI, firms are
much less likely to implement systems to identify and address conflicts
proactively.
The implementation of conflict management systems, also known as
Grievance Redress Mechanisms, is highlighted in the literature as
influential in enhancing resilience and identifying and mitigating project
risks. xxi Such systems provide predictable conflict resolution processes
that are regarded as effective and fair.xxii As evidenced by several cases
in the database, the implementation of good practices coupled with a
conflict management framework help firms identify the key environmental
and social management actions, community benefit provisions, and
comprehensive decision-making processes that are required to avoid
disruptions. Conflict management frameworks become more critical in
countries with less-than-average institutional capacity; there, applicable
environmental and social regulations are not enough or in par with
international good practices to properly account for and mitigate the
environmental and social impacts of large infrastructure projects.

However, the majority of firms either lack the technical capabilities or have
not demonstrated the willingness to allocate enough time to implement
such initiatives. They also lack a conflict management and resolution
system to deal with conflicts as they arise during operations. Such
frameworks are still not widely used in most infrastructure sectors.
However, some interviewees mentioned that firms and organizations in
the resource and energy sectors, which have experienced many conflicts,
have developed their own risk and conflict management frameworks to
provide guidance for avoiding or addressing conflicts more adequately.xxiii

4.10. IFI-funded Projects Address Conflicts More Effectively
The database includes projects funded by IFIs, together with projects
funded by other public or private resources. The interviewees reported that
IFI-funded projects are generally better prepared and, when in countries
with lower-than-average institutional capacities, come with more stringent
environmental and social management protocols and monitoring initiatives
that exceed local regulations.
Our research shows that, even if IFI-funded projects cannot avoid
conflicts, on average these conflicts were slightly lighter as measured by
our conflict escalation and consequences indicators. However, the major
impact of IFI policies and safeguards is shown in the company responses
to conflict (Figure 34). The average response score for IFI-funded projects
is higher than the average response score for projects that were not
funded by an IFI.

Our research demonstrates that these actions are effective in mitigating
risks and managing conflicts. An interviewee reported that a conflict
management framework allows their firm to evaluate risks when
developing a particular project. Some of the parameters that are
considered include the profile of local communities, risks associated with
the location of the project, resources required, and type of infrastructure
service to be provided.
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follow-up research work could address. The list is non-exhaustive nor in
any specific order; more likely, it is a depository of ideas the authors and
the guiding team at the IDB had at various stages of this work.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Recommendations for States and Governments
Ensure that national laws are comprehensive and universal.

FIGURE 34. AVERAGE COMPANY RESPONSE SCORE, NON-IFI-FUNDED
PROJECTS AND IFI-FUNDED PROJECTS.
SD(NON-IFI-FUNDED) =25.7, SD(IFI-FUNDED) = 28, T-STATISTIC (2)=2.10,
P-VALUE=0.036.

4.11. The Study of Conflicts is an Open-ended Process
The extent and ambition of this study, as well as the importance of its
emergent findings, provide as many follow-up questions as answers.
These questions define a list of suggestions for future work. Work that can
further elucidate the intricate nature of conflict in infrastructure projects in
Latin America and beyond, as well as some of the limitations of the current
study.
For example, are conflicts in Latin American infrastructure different than in
other places? What to do in areas where there is significant prejudice
against infrastructure? What happens with infrastructure its users consider
a universal right? How to allocate costs of sustainable development in
projects? Please see Appendix B for the complete set of questions that

Many projects, especially those promoted as being of national interest,
faced violent conflicts because local communities alleged that national
laws and regulations were sidestepped in carrying out these projects. In
such cases, local communities were also convinced that reporting law
violations would be ineffective to safeguard their rights, and that
developers would not be held accountable for inflicting environmental
damage. Therefore, when access to the justice system was not clear,
communities resorted to violent disruptive expressions to voice their
concerns.
Lack of transparency in the stages of project assessment, evaluation of
alternatives, and permitting lead to biased and incoherent decisions, which
erode trust and encourage opposition of the community. More important,
this inevitably raises tensions that often lead to violent conflicts.
Governments should explicitly demonstrate that projects would comply
with all relevant national laws. Dysfunctional laws and regulations that
prevent companies from developing projects efficiently must be modified
and adapted so that they fit their original purpose of ensuring adequate
environmental and social management and enhancing the quality of life of
local communities.
Working collaboratively with development institutions, financiers, and
project owners would help governments to identify laws, regulations, and
policies that put obligations on firms which lead to suboptimal and
unsustainable project designs in order to remove or clarify these laws and
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policies. Many laws and regulations were enacted at times where
sustainability and comprehensive community engagement were not
important considerations for project designs. Therefore, identifying and
updating such regulations, and design and construction standards would
enable governments to develop more sustainable projects, and engage
communities more meaningfully.

Strategically develop institutional capacities to contain
conflicts.
Our analysis shows that certain countries lack the institutional capacity to
avoid and manage conflicts before they escalate to violent confrontations.
There, conflicts tend to escalate more often and result in substantial
consequences. Many interviewees reported that even countries with the
highest institutional development often lack the technical and institutional
capacity to enforce laws and regulations systematically, which inevitably
also leads to significant conflicts.
Enhancing institutional capacity to manage conflicts proactively should be
a top priority for governments. In countries with lower-than-average levels
of institutional development, governments can work with financiers and
development institutions to devise adequate environmental and social
management standards and identify effective regulatory reforms. For
example, such reforms might include the integration of prior consultation
into national law, as well as expanding upon what good practices are
required for a proper consultation process. In countries with higher-thanaverage levels of institutional development, governments can work with
financiers and development institutions on enhancing their capabilities to
enforce laws and regulations, and develop more participatory project
design requirements.

Start planning at the regional level.
Deficient planning is the most dominant driver of conflicts in our research.
Projects were often sited close to or within natural environments on which

communities depend for their livelihoods. Alternative locations were rarely
assessed in a transparent manner. Moreover, project designs often
accounted for the project’s impacts within its immediate area of influence,
but did not address the indirect impacts to other regional communities and
the cumulative impacts from other projects nearby. Impact assessments
many times were structured in order to get the project approved, rather
than in a way to fully capture all impact dimensions.
Our analysis shows that when governments focus on long-term plans that
transparently indicate how projects would help regional communities
develop sustainably without affecting their traditional local values, projects
are less likely to face conflicts. This is particularly important for projects of
national interest, as in most cases local communities reported that they do
not receive adequate benefits from such projects. Effective government
plans identify potential synergies between infrastructure, such as energy
portfolio modernization, and national development goals, such as poverty
alleviation. This helps to demonstrate how infrastructure assists regions
alleviate poverty and inequality, rather than focusing on the provision of
short-term jobs.
The Chilean Ministry of Public Works, for instance, integrates large-scale
planning considerations when developing new project pipelines. Project
proposals are required to address regional development plans and
synergies from multiple infrastructure projects in a region. In the national
project development system, planning assessments are conducted as
early as possible, at the policy level when projects are conceived. This
way, a wider range of environmental, social, and economic issues are
evaluated during project design and execution.
It is also important to enhance and enforce planning requirements in order
to guide more prudent project site selections. Many projects in the
database faced strong opposition because they were sited in areas of
cultural significance or close to pristine ecosystems. Our research shows
that government project planning methodologies that evaluate additional

35

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

feasible project locations, and use more stringent technical criteria to avoid
siting projects close to critical ecosystems and watersheds are more
effective in avoiding conflicts.

and social regulatory requirements. This can be informed by IFI policies
and other good practices that this and other studies have shown to
contribute to mitigation of conflicts.

The project case analysis shows that governments avoided siting projects
in floodplains, adverse geologic formations, on land of high ecological
value, and prime farmland to avoid conflicts. Project evaluations
considered alternative site locations with adequate buffer zones from such
landscapes, wetlands, watersheds, and other critical ecosystems. In
addition, project designs included habitat protection and monitoring plans
to preserve such buffers throughout operations and decommissioning.

Design fair systems for distribution of project benefits.

Furthermore, projects successful in mitigating conflicts included
collaborative initiatives between community leaders and developers to
identify historic, cultural, and archaeological resources within or close to
the project site. Projects were designed to maintain the local character of
the community, preserve cultural resources and, where possible and
economically feasible, help rehabilitate and restore lost features and
landscapes.

Implement stringent environmental and social regulations.
Environmental degradation, pollution, and impacts on the traditional value
systems of local people have been among the most prominent conflict
drivers throughout our analysis. Conflicts often escalated because of these
drivers, as firms did not utilize stringent social and environmental
safeguards to mitigate environmental and social impacts.
Although EIA requirements differ from country to country, often they do not
effectively address the wide range of social and environmental impacts to
be mitigated or compensated when developing infrastructure projects. In
general, more stringent safeguards that cover a wider range of social and
environmental requirements are enforced when projects are funded by
IFIs. Governments can focus on enhancing the applicable environmental

Lack of adequate community benefits led to conflicts in eight out of ten
projects we studied. In many cases, local communities were not convinced
that the proposed benefits would materialize, while in some other cases
they were just not offered any benefits. In addition, most communities
alleged that most of the project benefits were distributed to more
developed regions, most likely close to the country’s capital region, that
did not have to endure any negative project impacts.
Ensuring that project benefit distribution systems allocate an adequate
share of benefits to local communities is important in order to avoid
conflicts. In projects successful in mitigating conflicts, project benefits go
beyond the provision of jobs and cash payments, and include capacitybuilding, training, and educational initiatives. Infrastructure firms are not
responsible for how benefits are distributed in the country, but
governments can request their assistance as a mediator with capacitybuilding efforts to reach just agreements with local communities. This in
turn would help establish a relationship based on trust and collaboration.
Project benefit systems can also include programs to improve productivity
at the community scale. Our research shows that a particular effective way
of generating benefits for the community is to work collaboratively with
developers and local community leaders to identify community
infrastructures that could be repaired and/or integrated into project designs
to enhance connectivity to neighboring regions and reduce the cost of
procuring and producing critical supplies.
In some other cases, local communities are responsible for managing the
distribution of project benefits, but often lack the technical and institutional
capacity to do so effectively. It is often difficult to evaluate who deserves

36

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

to be compensated, which becomes even more complicated when
compensation entails relocation to a new area. Our analysis shows that in
such cases, collaborating with developers and community leaders on
capacity-building efforts would help communities better manage the
allocation of benefits.

initiatives focus on reducing resource, water, and energy consumption and
cover the entire life cycle of projects. This is especially important for
technologies that are innovative but with limited project applications,
whose benefits or effectiveness might be questioned by local
communities. For instance, materials could be sourced locally, from
suppliers that follow sustainable procurement practices.

Ensure that local communities can voice their concerns.
Many projects lacked communication channels and community
engagement mechanisms for voicing, addressing, and integrating
community concerns into project design and execution. Conflicts often
escalated to violent confrontations because local communities were
convinced that disrupting project activities would be the only way to make
their concerns heard. Community engagement initiatives that address
community concerns and grievances in a systematic and transparent
manner are effective in building trust and mutually beneficial long-term
relationships. Communities are much less likely to disrupt project activities
when they are regarded as an important agent in the decision-making
process.

5.2. Recommendations for Developers and Contractors
Develop sustainable projects to avoid conflicts.
Choosing the most suitable project location is not enough to avoid conflicts
when the project is unsustainable, thus more likely to negatively affect
local communities. On the other hand, high-quality sustainable projects
are less likely to cause conflicts. Sustainable project designs that require
fewer raw materials and resources during construction and operations,
consume less energy, divert waste from landfills, and minimize
greenhouse gas emissions are less likely to affect local communities and
ecosystems nearby and face conflicts.

Establish a conflict management framework.
According to several interviewees, most infrastructure firms lack a
comprehensive conflict management framework to be applied in advance
to minimize risks when developing projects. This is becoming increasingly
important, since conventional risk management frameworks are not
enough to anticipate and mitigate conflicts and their dynamic
consequences. Moreover, even in cases where comprehensive
environmental and social impact assessments were required, design
solutions were often not implemented as planned. The lack of a
comprehensive risk management framework makes it difficult to
implement adaptive management plans to quickly mitigate social and
environmental impacts. In most cases, firms have to manage
environmental, social, or economic risks without a clearly defined action
plan and are not able to prevent community grievances from escalating to
violent confrontations.

Implement initiatives to expand the knowledge, skills, and
capacity of community members.
Conflicts often escalated because local communities were convinced that
their needs would be disregarded and projects would not help them
develop sustainably. Our analysis showed that developers who holistically
assess community needs, goals, and plans, and demonstrate how the
project would provide better-quality jobs and contribute to long-term
community competitiveness, are more successful in managing conflicts.

Considering a life-cycle approach when planning new projects would help
developers identify sustainability opportunities. Effective sustainability
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As such, education and training programs that address community
employment needs and improve the local skill base, with an emphasis on
minorities, are more likely to mitigate future community opposition. Firms
that help local workers develop skills and capacities to enhance long-term
community competitiveness are equally more likely to establish a longterm positive relationship with communities. Project developers that
design projects to enhance community competitiveness can demonstrate
the positive impacts of the project for local communities most effectively.
However, infrastructure projects might affect various community groups in
different ways. Patterns of social exclusion, poverty and other factors are
likely to affect how a conflict evolves. As such, a disaggregated
stakeholder mapping and engagement process is recommended in order
to effectively address the concerns of every community group.

Allocate time and resources to the consultation process.
Most interviewees mentioned that firms do not allocate enough time and
resources when conducting consultation processes. In fact, firms often
regard consultation as an insignificant requirement that needs to be done
as fast as possible. Government authorities usually specify minimal
requirements for consultation, but our analysis shows that firms that
innovate and exceed these requirements are usually able to sustain much
better relationships with communities.
Both the interviews and the project case analyses show that the minimum
requirements for consultation often prevent community engagement from
being most effective. In the wide majority of evaluated cases within the
project database, firms that allocated enough time for consultation gained
benefits in terms of minimized community opposition over the long term.

Focus on transparency to build an effective relationship with
local communities.
The lack of trust between local communities, developers, infrastructure
firms, and government officials is a significant driver of conflicts. At the
same time, the evaluation of most project cases showed that communities

did not always oppose project developments. In fact, they often considered
them as a necessity, but wanted to be involved in the decision-making
process. Furthermore, many communities explicitly stated that they did not
initially oppose projects, but became critical of them when the communities
were not included in the decision-making process and project information
was not shared with them. Therefore, building trust with local stakeholders
and potentially affected communities through a formal consultation
process should be the first priority of infrastructure firms, even when law
does not mandate it.
The most innovative strategies of successful firms in dealing with conflicts
often focus on involving communities in the project. In these, communities
are regularly invited to the project site to be informed about project
activities. In some cases, communities participate in environmental
management initiatives, such as water sampling or monitoring for
pollution. Through these initiatives, communities feel themselves to be an
integral part of the project and can act as project ambassadors to other
communities.

5.3. Recommendations for Lenders and Investors
Apply regional planning toolkits to fill the planning gap.
Our analysis shows that although regional planning toolkits exist,
governments, developers, and stakeholders often lack the institutional and
technical capacity to implement them in infrastructure projects. The
interviewees stated that in many cases, governments and developers are
not aware of such planning toolkits. Organizing and cataloguing good
practice planning and conflict management methodologies, tools, and
strategies in a systematic manner, per infrastructure sector and project
type, is the first step to ensure that these tools are made available to
governments, developers, and infrastructure owners when developing
new projects. This way, government officials and developers would be
better prepared to conduct comprehensive planning assessments,
address conflicts proactively, and develop more sustainable projects.
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Provide incentives for conflict management through funding
mechanisms.
The interviews and project case analyses showed that governments and
developers are not incentivized to use proactive risk management
frameworks when planning and developing projects. In order to develop
more sustainable and less conflictive project pipelines, lenders and
investors can provide that incentive by tying the implementation of good
practice planning and risk management strategies to funding mechanisms.
Given that a substantial investment is required to cover the current
infrastructure gap in LAC, introducing requirements for conflict
management good practices in funding mechanisms is the first step to
reduce risks for investors and developers, and ensure that infrastructure
is developed in a way that minimizes the potential for conflicts to arise and
escalate.

construction. Preparing for complexities during operations early on would
help developers ensure that enough resources are available and team
members understand their responsibilities and account for potential
shortfalls. From their side, financiers can ensure that enough resources
are allocated for evaluations during operations, to allow for more effective
long-term monitoring.

Establish monitoring over the whole project cycle.
Through the project case review we observed that, in many cases, a lot of
attention is put on environmental and social management and community
engagement during feasibility and planning. However, these initiatives are
often not implemented as planned during operations. On one hand,
government officials often lack the resources to implement and monitor
the required initiatives over the long term. On the other, developers and
financiers currently do not allocate as much resources to the
implementation phase, rather focusing on up-front construction costs. This
introduces vulnerabilities to conflicts during operations, as firms are not
best equipped to anticipate and mitigate conflicts in advance.
In our research, we found that projects supported by an IFI have less
conflicts and more effective responses to conflicts. This can be explained
in part by the IFI requirement for project monitoring during the repayment
phase of a credit, which is the operation phase. In these cases, firms
develop comprehensive maintenance and monitoring plans in advance of
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6. CONCLUSION
Through the 200 projects and expert interviews analysis, it is safe to say
that despite past lessons, conflicts continue to happen. The consequences
of such conflicts are detrimental for firms, investors, and national
governments. One out of five projects in the database were cancelled
because of conflicts, while only two out of ten did not face a delay. More
than half of the projects declared a cost overrun.
Each firm responds differently to conflicts, but those that take
comprehensive action to anticipate and mitigate conflicts in advance are
more likely to face less significant consequences and to implement their
projects to the end. On the other hand, firms that fail to consider the
significance of conflicts or choose to remain unresponsive to conflicts
when they arise usually face substantial consequences and are more likely
to see their projects cancelled or abandoned.
Yet, even if certain sectors have accumulated knowledge and good
practices, and multilateral institutions have expanded and finessed their
safeguard policies, the implementation of such practices in infrastructure
overall is still limited. Unfortunately, still many firms choose to remain
unresponsive to conflicts or do not respond adequately and on time.
Deficient upstream planning and lack of institutional capacity were
identified as overarching factors that exacerbate conflicts. Further
research can test assumptions and clarify why early, upfront planning is
missing and projects end up unprepared, and in wrong locations.
Similarly, further research can elaborate on whether research on conflict
helps or hinders the business case for sustainable infrastructure. All senior
finance reviewers viewed this work through a comprehensive business
scenario. The language of conflicts and the findings of this study may be
further empowered if connected with the notions of risk, value, and cost.
More strategic issues can also be included to further elaborate on the
issue.

Our research indicates that the value-add of solutions and good practices
for preventing or addressing a conflict will be best illustrated once the cost
of conflict is properly measured and quantified. Published sources rely on
company disclosures of cost overruns that are limited and cover only a
small part of the costs incurred in projects and the society through
conflicts. The total cost of conflict is likely much higher, both in direct
monetary impacts in projects, as well as through externalities in the society
at large. After quantifying the cost of conflict, companies can match
solutions to conflict drivers and identify the value add of each solution, e.g.
cost of inaction minus the resources an organization needs to implement
solutions.
In our work, we were able to identify company actions that help mitigate or
contain the impact of conflicts. Nevertheless, the existence of solutions
does not mean that these are always applied, nor does it mean that this
knowledge exists at all decision-making levels. Finally, any solution to
conflicts in infrastructure will not come as an unexpected finding that no
one could ever think of (at least we weren’t able to find one), but as a
continuous effort to collaborate, spread good practices, and align
incentives in the infrastructure sector.
To conclude this work, we urge all decision makers to scale up initiatives
and ramp up investments to prevent or avoid poorly planned projects that
lead to conflicts. Our call to action is for well-planned, sustainable
infrastructure projects. The stakes are high, the impacts are real, and our
decisions will affect the generations to come. Let’s make the right ones.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF FINDINGS
AND DATA SAMPLING
In order to evaluate the statistical significance of our findings, we
conducted the following analyses. First, we estimated the total amount
invested in infrastructure in LAC from 1980 to 2016. Then, we extrapolated
the total number of projects that have been built in LAC, again for the
period of our analysis. In order for our findings to be statistically significant,
our sample should be within 5–10% of this total. Our analysis shows that
our sample is statistically significant, in terms of both total invested amount
and total number of projects.
First, we estimated the budget invested in the LAC region in infrastructure
projects from 1980 to 2013 to be around US$1 trillion. xxiv xxv We summed
the budget of all 200 projects in the database to a total of US$267 billion,
or 26.7% of total, providing us with a confidence level of 95% and a 5%
margin of error. Secondly, we estimated the total number of projects built
during the same period to be around 3,300. Our 200-project sample
represents 6% of the total number of projects, which gives us a confidence
level of 95% and a margin of error of 6.75%. We acknowledge that all the
projects we have selected included a conflict. As such, the project
selection was not completely random, but this was part of the research
design as our central question was to inquire into the changing nature of
conflict. Further research can build upon our findings by examining both
conflictive and unconflictive projects.
Furthermore, the statistical quality of the quantitative analyses in this
report is inherently related to the availability, reliability and multiplicity of
data sources. On this, our work has been conducted within the available
resource boundaries of this study. Our data came from published material
we were able to identify through a rigorous, multi-month and multi-source
search. However, resource constraints did not allow us to conduct field
work on any of the 200 projects included in the database, nor develop

additional primary research on aspects that may have been
underrepresented (or completely absent) in the source material for a
project. As such, the data collected for the 200 projects may contain biases
and is, by design, as complete as the available published material for each
of the projects. Within this, we need to stress certain caveats, which are
also identified in similar studies in the field. xxvi
First, the claimed, alleged or actual nature of impacts that led to conflicts
was not tested nor verified through our research. Whenever possible, we
identified the alleged nature of a claim in each of the 200 project narratives.
However, our study sourced all impacts found in the literature, including
both allegations from a party in dispute about past or future damages to
them, with confirmed impacts (court decisions or facts such as a technical
failure or spill). Our quantitative analysis did not differentiate between
them, for reasons elaborated by Davis (2014) on the inherent challenges
of conducting such research: “The coding does not differentiate between
alleged and actual issues in dispute, partly due to the difficulty in reaching
an objective assessment in any particular case, but also in order to capture
the diversity of perspectives among the parties to conflicts.” We would like
to add that the elusive nature of the subject of inquiry here, the
environmental and social conflict in infrastructure, is central to this issue.
Oftentimes, key national institutions (e.g. the supreme court) require
several years to decide upon the validity or not of a claim, with supporting
documentation that requires multiples of the resources available in this
study to be developed, so as to substantiate a position for or against a
conflict claim.
Second, the multi-party, multi-dimension nature of infrastructure conflicts
may reflect one or more subjective positions of a given perspective in
published sources. Such a perspective may favor a specific party or
contain predispositions on the relative importance of an impact. This can
be particularly evident when conflicts arise about the future impacts of an
unbuilt project, and not an actual or alleged issue at an already operational
project. Furthermore, expanding upon Davis (2014), media reports and
civil society organizations are likely to highlight dramatic issues and cases;
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environmental NGOs may adopt a polemic stance against specific
dimensions of a project; and online sources or social networks may be
abused (through multiple unverified posts, for example) to support a claim
from a stakeholder or special interest group. xxvii
Third, the perspectives of one or more parties in conflict may not be
adequately represented in published sources, or completely missing. This
could be due to the differences in organization and operations of each
party, whereas a community can be vocal and issue multiple complaints
through the press whereas an infrastructure company limiting its press
responses and dealing with the issues directly but off the press with the
community. On the other hand, community concerns may not be included
in press reports, or even suppressed or banned, especially in places
where the freedom of the press is restricted through government or other
interventions. To capture the perspectives of each party typically involved
in an infrastructure project conflict, we expanded our interview list to
include all key stakeholders. However, to include such underreported or
missing perspectives or project narratives in the 200-project database
would require field work and additional primary research from our side,
which was beyond the scope of this project.
Fourth, given the geographic focus in LAC countries, published sources
may contain biases depending on the language of use in the source
channel. For example, English language data sources may be
underrepresented in small or local-scale conflicts, but exacerbated in
large-scale projects attracting international attention. In addition, sources
in local language (Spanish, Portuguese or French for LAC) may identify a
different set of conflicts than similar articles for the same project on
international press. We have anecdotal evidence of this happening in
cases where, for example, issues of prostitution, crime and drug abuse
were reported and emphasized in local language reports but issues of
economic development and investment were reported and emphasized in
international, English language reports about the same project. Our
research team was well-versed in each and every of the languages used

in LAC, and our data sources included in all cases both local and
international press. However, some of these biases may not have been
able to detect or avoid.
All the above being said, the study at hand and its authors made their best
to collect, scrutinize and analyze relevant and quality data for the scope of
research. Through the extent, number and geographic reach of the
projects analyzed, we are confident that the study offers findings and
insights that are relevant and can inform infrastructure project
stakeholders, policy-makers and scholars alike. We have elaborated
substantively on the quantitative analysis of our data, and as mentioned
earlier in this section, we are confident this represents the circumstances
in conflicted projects in Latin America.
Due to the caveats elaborated, we are conservative in making further
claims on the explanatory power of our findings for infrastructure projects
in general, and we hope our work provides as much quantitative evidence
as qualitative insights from a project pool. The broad and horizontal nature
of our sample, which was a decision taken at the start of this study,
provides a comparative and holistic look that we are not aware of being
done before. We acknowledge that some or all of the issues addressed in
our work justify much deeper examinations on their own, and we hope
these will be the subject of future research.

45

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

APPENDIX B: KEY QUESTIONS THAT ARISE FROM THIS
STUDY

sources. This could include interviews with knowledgeable outsiders and/
or project stakeholders, on a per-project or region basis.

Are conflicts in Latin American infrastructure different than in other
places? Similar studies in other parts of the world can further help
elaborate, confirm or contrast the study and its findings. Furthermore,
geographic diversion can help identify any trends or findings that are
idiosyncratic to Latin America infrastructure, which could be useful for
policy makers and local operators.

What is the right job training and provision package? Further work can
elaborate on what is a meaningful job training provision and community
development program when developing infrastructure. The question may
have added weight when doing projects in rural, agriculture regions with
high level of poverty.

How to evaluate the tradeoffs between operational efficiency and
environmental impacts when locating projects? Through our research
we observed that many times project locations were selected because
infrastructure would operate with much higher efficiencies (e.g. maximum
power generating capacity from hydropower projects). However, such
locations often endanger the environment, where in our research
frequently led to conflicts. What is the proper cost-benefit approach in
order to balance operational efficiencies in infrastructure, with the cost of
mitigating impacts? This relationship needs to be further evaluated to
provide recommendations for more prudent project site selections.
What happens with infrastructure its users consider a universal
right? Typical in water projects, but also in other cases, its users may not
be willing to pay for its full costs. What should be done in such cases? How
to make such infrastructure operationally feasible?
What can we learn from field studies in conflicted projects? Research
including field work in a select number of conflicted projects, visit the
projects and interview its participants in order to detail the actual
mechanics of how conflict evolved and documented the perspective of
each conflicted party through anthropological and organizational science
lenses.
Are published sources in infrastructure complete and
comprehensive? Additional studies can elucidate more perspectives in
conflicted projects through additional research that goes beyond published

What to do in areas where there is significant prejudice against
infrastructure? Certain regions or communities may have experienced
such negative events in the past, that are completely opposed to any new
project that comes. However, this may lead to lost investment, lack of
development, and perpetuate very high poverty levels. What can be done
to alleviate community prejudices?
What will be the impact of new technologies in infrastructure in the
next decade? Technological advancements may provide solutions to past
problems that led to conflicts. However, their benefits may not be
immediately accepted by the public, as we have seen in this research.
Furthermore, new technologies may pose additional challenges we
haven’t anticipated – for example, drastically reducing the number of jobs
an infrastructure project can provide. More research can elucidate trends
and provide insights that can help policy-makers and operators alike.
How to allocate costs of sustainable development in projects? For
example, the cost of reducing carbon emissions or procuring local
materials and providers may be an added extra in projects. Should the
government pay for it, dealing with externalities through taxes, or should
the operator include such costs in its budget? What is the role of
international financial and multilateral development institutions?
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APPENDIX C: DRIVERS OF CONFLICT PER SECTOR
Pollution and degradation are prominent environmental drivers in all
sectors, in particular in waste and resource extraction projects Historically
motivated opposition led to more conflicts in the energy, resource, and
waste sectors. Deforestation was most influential in urban development
and energy projects. Water scarcity affected mostly water and waste
projects, whereas climate change as a conflict driver was more prominent
in water, energy, and urban development projects.

energy projects. Finally, wage disputes were prominent in waste and
transportation projects.
The following graphs present the significance of conflict drivers per sector,
for all sectors.

Reduced access to resources and lack of community benefits led to social
conflicts in all six sectors. Impacts on local values affected all projects, but
mostly energy, resource, and water ones. Lack of local jobs was a
prominent conflict driver in energy, resource, and transportation projects,
whereas forced relocation was a conflict driver in urban development,
energy, and transportation projects. Crime and prostitution were most
common in energy and resource projects, especially rural ones. In general,
social drivers prominently affected the water, waste, and urban
development sectors.
Deficient planning and lack of adequate consultation were prominent
governance drivers in all six sectors. In fact, 100% of urban development
projects, and most energy and transportation projects, faced conflicts at
some point because of planning deficiencies. Lack of transparency and
corruption were very much correlated and a driver in energy, water, urban
development (especially in large urban centers), and transportation
projects. Previous bad reputation was most influential in resource and
waste projects.
Economic drivers of conflict were most prominent in water and
transportation projects, with the price of infrastructure service being the
most common driver. Excessive profit level was particularly influential in
driving conflicts in resource and transportation projects. Similarly, unjust
distribution of profits led to more conflicts in resource, transportation, and
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FIGURE C1. CONFLICT DRIVERS, RESOURCE PROJECTS.
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FIGURE C2. CONFLICT DRIVERS, ENERGY PROJECTS.
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FIGURE C3. CONFLICT DRIVERS, TRANSPORTATION PROJECTS.
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FIGURE C4. CONFLICT DRIVERS, WASTE PROJECTS.
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FIGURE C5. CONFLICT DRIVERS, URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.
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FIGURE C6. CONFLICT DRIVERS, WATER PROJECTS.
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APPENDIX D: CONFLICT DRIVERS THROUGHOUT THE
YEARS
Our research shows that deficient planning is the most significant conflict
driver throughout the period of our research. The percentage of projects
that faced conflicts because of environmental drivers has slightly
diminished, with the exception of the climate change driver that has
become much more prominent in more recent projects.

The percentage of projects that faced conflicts because of economic
drivers has increased, while the percentage of projects affected by
government works has dropped considerably. However, more research is
needed to clarify if this is a trend. The following graphs present an
overview of the significance of conflict drivers from 1980 until today, for all
projects

FIGURE D1. CONFLICT DRIVERS,
PROJECTS DEVELOPED IN THE

1980S.
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FIGURE D2. CONFLICT DRIVERS, PROJECTS DEVELOPED IN THE 1990S.
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FIGURE D3. CONFLICT DRIVERS, PROJECTS DEVELOPED IN THE 2000S.
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FIGURE D4. CONFLICT DRIVERS, PROJECTS DEVELOPED IN THE 2010S.
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APPENDIX E: TIMING OF CONFLICT AND FINAL PROJECT
STATUS
The following graph displays the relationship between the timing of conflict
in the project cycle and the final project status. Most projects in the
database that were cancelled because of conflicts faced conflicts early in
the project cycle. Delayed but still in progress projects show similar trends.
Projects that are operational faced conflicts later in the project cycle.

FIGURE E1. TIMING OF CONFLICT AND FINAL PROJECT STATUS, ALL PROJECTS.
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APPENDIX F: EVOLUTION OF COMPANY RESPONSE TO
CONFLICTS
Press statements, consultation, and regulatory compliance are the most
frequently observed general company actions in response to conflicts.
Innovation of processes and procedures at the company level that
exceeded applicable regulatory requirements, the participation of
independent experts, the use of force, and firms abandoning projects are
less common in more recent projects in the database. The last two
decades have seen the percentage of projects that involve communities
in project activities double, while the percentage of projects that focused
on community jobs and cash payments has diminished.
Investments in community capacity building and infrastructure are the
most common community benefits, while environmental improvements
is the most frequently observed environmental benefit. The percentage
of firms that focused on environmental restoration increased slightly,
whereas the percentage of firms implementing reforestation initiatives has
slightly diminished. However, more research is needed to clarify if this is a
trend. The proportion of firms that took no action to address conflicts is
constant throughout the period of our research, with the exception of 1990
when it dropped slightly. The following graphs present the significance of
all conflict drivers per decade, from 1980 until today.

FIGURE F1. COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICTS IN THE 1980S.
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FIGURE F2. COMPANY RESPONSE
TO CONFLICTS IN THE 1990S.

FIGURE

F3.

COMPANY

RESPONSE TO CONFLICTS
IN THE 2000S.
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FIGURE F4. COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICTS IN THE 2010S.
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APPENDIX G: CONFLICT ESCALATION, CONFLICT
CONSEQUENCE, AND COMPANY RESPONSE POINT
SYSTEMS
Conflict Escalation
Expressions of conflict in this study were grouped in four categories based
on their intensity: low, moderate, high, and extreme. Low includes press
statements, administrative complaints, and boycotts. Moderate includes
protests, blockades, arbitration, and litigation. High includes violence,
injuries, and damage to property. Finally, extreme includes deaths.
To further evaluate the manifestations of conflict, we developed a point
system that ranks conflicts based on their escalation level. Low
expressions of conflict receive 3 points, moderate expressions 12 points,
high 18 points, and extreme 20 points. We selected uneven intervals for
creating the point system to reflect the escalation differences, especially
the significance of the most extreme expressions.

Company Response to Conflict
We also developed a point system that ranks company responses and
actions to address conflicts. We structured the company response
indicator using accumulated knowledge and good practices. xxviii No action,
bankruptcy, and exit from project give 0 points, while use of force gives −4
points. Press statements, regulatory compliance, and participation of
independent experts give 4 points each. Consultation, community jobs,
reforestation, and community cash payments give 6 points each.
Community and government equity stake give 8 points each. Community
capacity building, community infrastructure, and environmental
improvements give 12 points each. Finally, environmental restoration,
community project participation, and Innovation of processes and
procedures in the company that exceeded applicable regulatory
requirements give 16 points each. We chose uneven intervals for creating
the point system to reflect the company action differences, both in terms
of budget and time requirements to implement some of these but also in
terms of their significance in containing conflicts.

Conflict Consequences
Similarly to the conflict escalation index, we developed a point system that
ranks the magnitude of consequences of conflict. Reputational damage,
independent expert review, and concession amendment were categorized
as low consequences (1 point each, 3 points in total). Joint venture
change, loss of productivity, project redesign, and redress payments were
categorized as moderate consequences (3 points each, 12 points in total).
Cost overruns, delays, fines, and project redesign were categorized as
high consequences (6 points each, 24 points in total). Project cancellation,
lack of development, loss of foreign investment, and imprisonment were
categorized as very high (12 points each, 48 points in total). Government
change was categorized as extreme (20 points). Again, we used uneven
intervals for the point system to reflect the consequence escalation
differences, especially the severity of the most extreme consequences.
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APPENDIX H: INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY OF COUNTRIES
AND CONFLICT
In the main body of the report we demonstrated that conflicts tend to
escalate to violent confrontations more easily and result in substantial
consequences more often in countries that lack the institutional capacity
to manage them effectively. To further test this relationship, we used four
additional indicators that reflect each country’s level of development,
institutional capacity, and governance. The indicators we selected are
GDP per capita, the Human Development Index (HDI), the Economist
Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, and the World Resource Institute’s
Environmental Democracy Index.

N). Then we compared the composite development indicator with the
severity of conflict escalation in each country. Again, the most severe
conflicts were observed in countries with the lowest composite
development indicators (Figure H1). The composite development indicator
model predicted a higher percentage of the variation.
We further evaluated the relationship between the significance of
consequences of conflicts and countries with lesser institutional
capacities. We calculated the average magnitude of consequences in
each country and compared it with each country’s rank in the composite
development indicator. Again, a positive correlation exists between the
countries with lower institutional capacity, as measured by our composite
development indicator, and more significant consequences of conflicts
(Figure H2). The composite development indicator model predicted a
higher percentage of the variation.

FIGURE H1. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND CONFLICT ESCALATION.
R= 54%, R2= 28.3%, P-VALUE= 0.025.
We calculated the average of these indicators along with the Rule of Law
index for each country represented in our database and ranked them
accordingly, assigning them a composite development indicator (Appendix

FIGURE H2. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT.
R= 70%, R2= 49.5%, P-VALUE= 0.00151.
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APPENDIX I: PROJECT SCALE AND CONFLICT
The next step of our analysis was to measure the effect of project scale,
as measured by its budget, on conflict escalation. We inflation-adjusted
each project budget (so that we could compare projects in the 1990s with
those in 2010),xxix and we found that larger projects generally had more
significant conflicts. Figure I1 shows that on average larger projects had
higher conflict escalation scores as measured through our conflict
escalation indicator. A potential explanation of this relationship would be
that larger projects in general create larger impacts and as such produce
more intense conflicts.

budget led to violent confrontations and resulted
consequences not usually observed in larger projects.

in

negative

We also found suggestive evidence that a correlation exists between
project scale and the severity of consequences, as larger projects tend to
result in more significant impacts that need to be avoided or compensated.
As shown in Figure I2, the most significant difference in conflict
consequence scores as measured through our conflict consequence
indicator is observed between very large projects in terms of budget
(budget US$ 1,500 million or more) and smaller projects. More research
is needed to delve into the mechanics of the relationship between projects
in lower budget categories.

FIGURE I1. CONFLICT ESCALATION AND PROJECT BUDGET, ALL PROJECTS.
FIGURE I2. CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT AND PROJECT BUDGET.
In fact, some experts have questioned the feasibility of such megaprojects.
In many cases the direct and indirect impacts they entail in terms of land
use change, relocation, and compensation of affected communities
inevitably spark community opposition. However, this is not always the
case, as specific projects orders of magnitude smaller in both scale and

We wanted to test the same relationship for more expensive projects. To
define what a more expensive project means, we grouped all projects by
category (for example hydropower) and then we calculated the cost per
unit of output per project. The selected infrastructure unit changes
according to the sector. For example, for energy projects we chose the
project’s capacity in MW, again we used inflation-adjusted costs. In each
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category, we identified the average and median cost per unit of output.
Then, we compared each project with the average costs in its category.
So, a project that cost twice as much as the average per unit of output
would have a 100% value, while a project that cost 20% less than the
average would have a −20% value.

channels. However, more research is needed to clarify the mechanics of
this relationship.
The average company response to conflicts also differs according to the
scale of the project. Figure I4 shows that the average company response
score, as measured with our indicator, is higher in larger than smaller
projects. The average response in very large projects (US$1,500 million
or more) is significantly higher than the average response in smaller
projects in terms of budget. More research is needed to delve into the
details of the relationship between projects in the lowest project budget
categories.

FIGURE I3. CONFLICT CONSEQUENCES AND COST PER UNIT DIFFERENCE FROM
THE INFRASTRUCTURE CATEGORY MEDIAN, ALL PROJECT.
R=10%, R2=3% P-VALUE=0.15.
In this second test, we found suggestive evidence that a positive
correlation exists between more severe conflict consequences and
projects with higher cost per unit of output (more expensive projects) as
compared to the median cost per unit of output for all projects. Projects
with higher costs per unit, or more expensive projects, generally led to
more significant conflicts as measured through our conflict escalation
indicator (Figure I3). One potential explanation for this relationship is that
more expensive projects, especially those that might be overpriced due to
corruption and ineffective bidding procedures, lead to more intense
conflicts, as it’s easier to identify these through contemporary media

FIGURE I4. COMPANY RESPONSE AND PROJECT BUDGET.
We also evaluated the relationship between the average company
response to conflict and the cost per unit of infrastructure output. Figure I5
shows that there is a correlation between projects with higher cost per unit
and less comprehensive responses to conflict. In other words, more
expensive projects led to more conflicts with more severe impacts, but
their sponsors did less to mitigate them. However, more research is
needed to clarify the mechanics of this relationship.
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FIGURE I5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMPANY CONFLICT RESPONSE SCORE
AND COST PER UNIT OF INFRASTRUCTURE OUTPUT.
R= 22%, R2= 5%, P-VALUE= 0.015.
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APPENDIX J: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

#

POSITION

1

Director of International
Relations

2

CEO

3

Director of Social Responsibility

4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Manager of Health, Safety, and
the Environment
Manager at the Barahona power
plant
Windfarm Development
Manager
General Manager, Ecuador
Responsible for the Social
Management and Sustainability
Program
Director of Business
Development
Manager, Latin America Smart
Infrastructure Regional Unit

11

Regional Director

12

15

Senior Consultant
Senior Environmental
Specialist_Associate
Environmental Group
Leader_Associate
Managing Director

16

Vice Coordinator

13
14

COMPANY
Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional
(FDN)
Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional
(FDN)
Refinería de Cartagena S.A.
(Reficar)
Empresa Generadora de
Electricidad Haina S.A.
Empresa Generadora de
Electricidad Haina S.A.
Empresa Generadora de
Electricidad Haina S.A.
Corporación América

COMPANY SECTOR /
PROJECT TYPE

LOCATION

Financial institution

Colombia

Financial institution

Colombia

Oil & Gas (refinery)

Colombia

Renewables / wind farms
Renewables / wind farms
Renewables / wind farms
Airports

Dominican
Republic
Dominican
Republic
Dominican
Republic
Multinational

Odebrecht

Large infrastructure
projects / hydropower

Multinational

Asergen S.C.

Hydropower

Mexico

The Nature Conservancy

NGO

Multinational

C40 Latin American Cities Climate
Change Leadership Group

Urban context and climate
adaptation

Multinational

Golder Associates

Engineering consultant

Multinational

Golder Associates Peru S.A.

Engineering consultant

Peru

Golder Associates Peru S.A.

Engineering consultant

Peru

Shift
Center for Sustainability Studies
(GVCs)

Conflict expert

Multinational

Research institution

Brazil
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Local Development Program
Coordinator
Local Development Program
Researcher
CFO
Chief of Socio-Environmental
Projects at EPSA

Center for Sustainability Studies
(GVCs)
Center for Sustainability Studies
(GVCs)
Confidential
Empresa de Energia del Pacifico
S.A. E.S.P. (EPSA)

21

Director of International
Relations

22

Finance Specialist

17
18
19
20

23

24

25
26

27
28
29
30
31

Hydropower Commercial
Director at MWH
Environmental & Social
Responsibility Leader (Global),
Key Initiatives Leader (Latin
America), Vice President at
MWH Global
Environmental Manager at MWH
Chile
Social Area Coordinator,
Department of Environment at
MWH Global
Environmental & Social
Coordinator
Project manager, Cerro de Hula
wind farm
Specialist Corporate Social
Responsibility
Coordinator of Environment and
Social Development, Cerro de
Hula Wind Farm
COO, Panama and El Salvador

Research institution

Brazil

Research institution

Brazil

Hydropower

Guatemala

Oil & Energy

Colombia

Agencia Reguladora de
Saneamento e Energia do Estado
de Sao Paulo (ARSESP)

Energy and sewage

Brazil

Instituto Financiero para el
Desarrollo del Valle del Cauca –
INFIVALLE

Finance

Colombia

MWH Global

Mining, energy, and
engineering

Multinational

MWH Global

Mining, energy, and
engineering

Multinational

MWH Global

Mining, energy, and
engineering

Chile

MWH Global

Mining, energy, and
engineering

Chile

Globeleq Mesoamerica Energy

Energy

Multinational

Globeleq Mesoamerica Energy

Wind farm

Honduras

Globeleq Mesoamerica Energy

Energy

Multinational

Globeleq Mesoamerica Energy

Energy

Multinational

AES Corporation

Energy

Multinational
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32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Treasurer at AES Central
America & Caribbean
Global Lead for Socio-Economic
Development
Director General of Public
Works
Environmental Manager Project Manager
Sustainability Management
Chief Sustainable Development
Officer
Project Manager, Nueva
Alameda Provodencia
Head of Sustainability and
Community Relations
Resources Assistant Manager

43

Environmental Director and
General Service
Head, Project Management and
Engineering
Director General

44

Project Manager

45

Head of Environment at EDP

41
42

AES Corporation

Energy

Multinational

Anglo American

Mining

Multinational

Ministry of Public Works, Chile

Public infrastructure works

Chile

MWH Global
Latin America Power (LAP)

Mining, energy, and
engineering
Renewable energy
(hydropower and wind
farms)

Peru
Multinational

Colbun S.A.

Energy

Chile

Metropolitan Regional Government,
Chile

Government

Chile

Enel Green Power

Renewable energy

Multinational

Confidential

Renewable energy

Chile

AES Chivor

Energy

Multinational

Jamaica Public Service Company

Energy

Jamaica

Eosol Energy de México
Agencia Nacional de
Infraestructura, Colombia
Energias do Brasil

Energy

Mexico

Transportation (Highways)

Colombia

Energy

Brazil
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APPENDIX K: QUESTIONNAIRE
Conflict related questions:
1.What are the types of conflict that may arise during the development of an infrastructure project in Latin America?
2. What are the main consequences for projects and sponsors from such conflicts?
3. When are conflicts most likely to occur during the project development phase?
4. Are the direct and indirect costs of conflicts properly accounted for when developing an infrastructure project?
Social conflict:
5. What are the main social conflicts that may arise in infrastructure projects in Latin America?
6. What are the main impacts from such conflicts?
7. Can you point out any project that may have experienced social conflicts in the region?
8. Is there a framework for social conflict identification?
9. Has the involvement of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) decreased the number of social conflicts or the severity of them?
Environmental conflict:
10. What are the main environmental conflicts that could arise in infrastructure projects in Latin America?
11. What are the main impacts from such conflicts?
12. Can you point out any project that may have experienced environmental conflicts in the region?
Company response
13.How do companies respond to conflicts?
14.In case of conflict, who will be the person responsible for managing the situation?
15. What is the most common approach used in companies (if so) for future conflict preparedness?
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APPENDIX L: 200 PROJECT DATABASE

#

PROJECT

SECTOR

LOCATION

Transportation

Colombia

Resource

Chile

El Salitre Wastewater Treatment Plant

Waste

Colombia

4

El Tatio Geothermal Development

Energy

Chile

5

Metrobus Buenos Aires

Transportation

Argentina

6

Rodoanel Mario Covas Highway, East Section

Transportation

Brazil

7

Copahue Geothermal Power Plant

8

Line 3 Santiago Subway

9

Pedra do Sal Urban Development

10

1

Bahia Port

2

Paipote Smelter

3

Energy

Argentina

Transportation

Chile

Urban development

Brazil

São Lourenço Water Production System

Water

Brazil

11

Waste Treatment Center (CTR Rio)

Waste

Brazil

12

Dosquebradas pipeline network

Water

Colombia

13

Metrobus Asunción Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)

Transportation

Paraguay

14
15

International Water Services Project Guayaquil "Interagua"
Codelco Ventanas Refinery

Water
Resource

16

Paraguay - Parana Waterway

17

Cartagena Refinery

Resource

Ecuador
Chile
Paraguay/Argentina/Bolivia/
Uruguay/Brazil
Colombia

18

Bordo Poniente Landfill Gas to Energy project

Waste

Mexico

19

Concessionária da Linha 4 do Metro de São Paulo

Transportation

Brazil

20

Montevideo Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)

Transportation

Uruguay

21

Cordoba Recycling Plant

Waste

Argentina

22

TransMilenio Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)

Transportation

Colombia

23

Aguas do Mirante

24

San Ramon - San Jose Highway

25

PET-1-2009 Transmission Line

26

ANTEL Arena

Transportation

Water

Brazil

Transportation

Costa Rica

Energy

Guatemala

Urban development

Uruguay
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27

Laguna Colorada Geothermal Power Plant

Energy

Bolivia

28

Metro de Medellin

Transportation

Colombia

29

Cero Prieto Geothermal Project

Energy

Mexico

30

Manta Port

Transportation

Ecuador

31

Punta Alcade Thermal Power Plant

Energy

Chile

32

Chilibre Potable Water Treatment Plant

Water

Panama

33

Lima Subway Line 2

Transportation

Peru

34

Vía Parque Rímac

35

Urban Development in Horto, Rio de Janeiro

36

Transnordestina

37

Transportation

Peru

Urban development

Brazil

Transportation

Brazil

Berlin Geothermal Power Plant

Energy

El Salvador

38

San Francisco River Water Transfer

Water

Brazil

39

Integral del Circuito Interior de la Ciudad de México

Transportation

Mexico

40

TransSantiago Integrated Public Transportation System

Transportation

Chile

41

Carajás S11D Iron Project

Resource

Brazil

42

Metropolitano Bus Rapid Transit System

Transportation

Peru

43

Picachos - Mazatlan Water Pipeline

Water

Mexico

44

Los Laurelles Landfill

Waste

Mexico

45

Metro Bogota

Transportation

Colombia

46

Esmeraldas Refinery

Resource

Ecuador

47

Rosarito Beach Desalination Plant

Water

Mexico

48

Cuiabá light Rail System

Transportation

Brazil

49

Modernization and Expansion of Eldorado Airport

Transportation

Colombia

50

Boyeco landfil

51

Cement Plant Haitises

52

Cutzamala Potable Water Supply System

53
54

Pueblo Viejo Mine
Julianca Airport

55

Jumandy Airport

Waste

Chile

Resource

Dominican Republic

Water

Mexico

Resource

Dominican Republic

Transportation

Peru

Transportation

Ecuador
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56

Chinchero Cusco Airport

Transportation

Peru

57

Los Robles Thermoelectric Power Plant

Energy

Chile

58

Tia Maria Mine

Resource

Peru

59

Tintaya Mine

Resource

Peru

60

Bioenergy Biofuels Plant

Energy

Colombia

61

Metrovia BRT

Transportation

Ecuador

62

Cargill Agricola Santarem Port

Transportation

Brazil

63

Manta Manaus Multimodal Corridor

Transportation

Ecuador/Peru/Brazil

64

Mulalo Loboguerrero Highway

Transportation

Colombia

65

Taboada Wastewater Treatment Plant

Waste

Peru

66

Armenia Substation and Transmission Line

Energy

Colombia

67

Tribuga Port

Transportation

Colombia

68

Development in Cerro El Elquacil

Urban development

Colombia

69

Punta Lara Potable Water Plant

Water

Argentina

70

Petaca Port

Transportation

Colombia

71

Cienaga Barranquilla Highway

72

Urban Developments in Panama Bay

73

Transportation

Colombia

Urban development

Panama

Portland Bight Port

Transportation

Jamaica

74

Panama City Metro Line 1

Transportation

Panama

75

Xalala Dam

Energy

Guatemala

76

Special Economic Development Zones (ZEDE)

Urban development

Honduras

77

Atenco International Airport

Transportation

Mexico

78

Belo Monte Hydropower Project

Energy

Brazil

79

Tucurui Hydropower Complex

Energy

Brazil

80

Haujara Landfill in Oruro

Waste

Bolivia

81

Lliquimuni Block Exploration Project

Resource

Bolivia

82

Acueducto Independencia

Water

Mexico

83

Atucha II Nuclear Power Plant

Energy

Argentina

84

Bocamina Thermal Power Plant

Energy

Peru
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85

Kiyu Wind Power Project

Energy

Uruguay

86

El Libertador Wind Power Project

Energy

Uruguay

87

MetroCali Bus Rapid Transit

Transportation

Colombia

88

Boulevard Turistico del Atlantico Highway

Transportation

Dominican Republic

89

BusCaracas, Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) Project

Transportation

Venezuela

90

Cochabamba Beni Highway

Transportation

Bolivia

91

Eolica del Sur Wind Project

Energy

Mexico

92

Yacyreta Hydropower Project

Energy

Argentina

93

Sao Luiz do Tapajos Hydropower Project

Energy

Brazil

94

HidroAysen Hydropower Project

Energy

Chile

95

Ralco Hydropower Project

Energy

Chile

96

Pangue Hydropower Project

Energy

Chile

97

Huachipa

Water

Peru

98

La Farfana Wastewater Treatment Plant

Waste

Chile

99

Jorge Carstens Aqueduct

Water

Argentina

100

La Parotta Hydropower Project

Energy

Mexico

101

Barro Blanco Hydropower Project

Energy

Panama

102

Pacifico Thermoelectric Power Plant

Energy

Chile

103

Chaco Central Aqueduct

Water

Paraguay

104

Cayambe Landfill

Waste

Ecuador

105

Los Pelambres Mine

Resource

Chile

106

Marlin Mine

Resource

Guatemala

107

Las Crucitas Mine

Resource

Costa Rica

108

Laderas Norte Water Treatment Plant

Waste

Bolivia

109

Wastewater and Sewer System in La Pintada

Waste

Panama

110

Buenaventura Water Supply and Distribution Network

Water

Colombia

111
112

Naucalpan - Toluca Highway
San Martin Port

Transportation
Transportation

Mexico
Peru

113

Oleoducto de Crudos Pasados (OCP) Pipeline

Resource

Ecuador
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114

Interoceanic Highway

Transportation

Peru/Brazil

115

Santo Domingo Subway (Line 2-Metro Santo Domingo)

Transportation

Dominican Republic

116

La Hydrovia Amazonica

Transportation

Peru/Brazil

117
118

Gibraltar Gas Extraction Project
Gasoducto sur Peruano

Resource
Resource

Colombia
Peru

119

Water Management Project for La Paz and El Alto

Water

Bolivia

120
121

Camisea Gas Project
Ituango Hydropower Project

Resource
Energy

Peru
Colombia

122

Cano Limon Covenas Pipeline

Resource

Colombia

123

La Colosa Mine

Resource

Colombia

124
125

Cambalam Hydropower Project
El Dorado Mine

Energy
Resource

Guatemala
El Salvador

126

Chixoy Hydroelectric Project

Energy

Guatemala

127

Lago de Valencia Water Transfer Project

Water

Venezuela

128

San Jorge Mine

Resource

Argentina

129

Quellaveco Mine

Resource

Peru

130

Pascua Lama Mine

Resource

Chile

131

El Morro Mine

Resource

Peru

132
133

Arauco Celulosa Plant, Valdivia
El Desquite Mine

Resource
Resource

Chile
Argentina

134

Yanacocha Mine

Resource

Peru

135
136

Tambo Grande Mine
Jirau and Santo Antonio Dams

Resource

Peru

Energy

Brazil

137

Baleia Wind Project

138

XI Oil Exploration Project

139

Olavarria Landfill

140

Pinchanaki Gas Exploration

141
142

Energy

Brazil

Resource

Ecuador

Waste

Argentina

Resource

Argentina

Cochabamba Water Concession

Water

Bolivia

Laguna Verde

Energy

Mexico
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143

Offshore Oil Exploration Project Belize

Resource

Belize

144

La Cadellada Wastewater Treatment Plant

Waste

Chile

145

Cutomay Camones Landfill

Waste

El Salvador

146

Oil & Gas in Coari

Resource

Bolivia

147

Maldonado Water Distribution Network

Water

Uruguay

148

Rio Hondo Block, Bolivia

Resource

Bolivia

149

Pungarayacu Oil Exploration Project

Resource

Ecuador

150

Comperj Petrochemichal Complex in Rio de Janeiro

Resource

Brazil

151
152

Marmato Mine
Los Encinos Dam

Resource
Energy

Colombia
Honduras

153

Pacific Railroad

Transportation

Colombia

154

Castilla Thermal Power Plant

Energy

Chile

155

Mining San Cristobal

Resource

Bolivia

156
157

Las Cruces Dam Mexico
Pacific LNG Pipeline

Energy
Resource

Mexico
Bolivia

158

El Quimbo Hydroelectric Project

Energy

Colombia

159

La Chureca Recycling Project

Waste

Nicaragua

160

Chalillo Dam

Energy

Belize

161
162

Valentines Mine
Parnaiba Thermoelectric Complex

Resource
Energy

Uruguay
Brazil

163

Buenaventura Port Expansion

Transportation

Colombia

164
165

El Zapotillo Water Project
Monterrey Aqueduct VI

Water
Water

Mexico
Mexico

166
167

Octopus LNG Project
Tunel de la Linea

Resource
Transportation

Chile
Colombia

168

La Matanza Landfill

Waste

Argentina

169
170

Doe Run Refinery
Mexico City Subway Line 12

Resource
Transportation

Peru
Mexico

171

Grupo Melka Palm Oil and Cocoa Plantations

Energy

Peru
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172

Wind Farms Caetite

Energy

Brazil

173

Coal Transport in Santa Marta Port

Transportation

Colombia

174

Cruz del Eje Potable Water Plant

Water

Argentina

175

Hydraulic Fracturing in Loma de Lata Field

Resource

Argentina

176

Moyobamba Iquitos Transmission Line

Energy

Peru

177

Jardim Gramacho Landfill Gas to Energy

Waste

Brazil

178

Samarco Mining Complex

Resource

Brazil

179

Rosario Port

Transportation

Argentina

180

Nuclear Waste Storage in Gastre

Waste

Argentina

181

Usina Verde Waste to Energy Plant

Waste

Brazil

182

Valle Coche Highway

Transportation

Venezuela

183
184

DeepWater Port Araya
Rio de Janeiro Subway Line 4

Transportation
Transportation

Venezuela
Brazil

185
186

Chiloe Wind Power Project
Suesca Cement Factory

Energy
Resource

Chile
Colombia

187
188

Acueducto RíoPance Water Project
Sapeacu Thermal Power Plant Energy Reserve Complex

Water
Energy

Colombia
Brazil

189

General Lake Aqueduct

Water

Chile – Argentina

190

Gran Tulum Aqueduct

Water

Argentina

191

Franja Transversal del Norte (FTN) Highway

Transportation

Guatemala

192

Angra 3

Energy

Brazil

193

Paraguana Refinery Complex

Resource

Venezuela

194

Dona Juana Landfill

Waste

Colombia

195
196

ElCarrasco Landfill Colombia
Landfill in Gameleiro

Waste
Waste

Colombia
Brazil

197
198

Hazardous Waste and Recycling Plant in Zimapan
Rio Azul Landfill

Waste

Mexico

Waste

Costa Rica

199
200

Usina Trapiche
Systema Tui IV Water Project

Energy
Water

Brazil
Venezuela
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APPENDIX M: CODING ANALYSIS

Pollution
Degradation
Deforestation
Water issues
Historic opposition to
similar projects
Climate change
Reduced access to
resources

Forced relocation

•
•
•
•

THE NATURE OF CONFLICT
ENVIRONMENTAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
Introduction of polluting substances in ecological areas of high importance.
Destruction of ecosystems and habitats, and extinction of wildlife.
Loss of forested areas.
Water scarcity due to high project water needs, or loss of access to water sources.

•

Projects similar to those that have inflicted environmental damage and led to conflicts in the past.

•

Generation of greenhouse gas emissions, conversion of wetlands or other ecosystems that jeopardizes carbon
sequestration capacity.
SOCIAL DRIVERS OF CONFLICT

•

Lack of or disruption of access to food, land, mineral, forest, and marine resources.

•
•
•
•

Disputes in relocating local people.
Lack of documentation and difficulties in proving land ownership.
Disagreements in the land compensation process.
Migration of people looking for work opportunities, which may illegally occupy land before construction and seek
compensation as if they were long-time residents.
Inadequate resettlement housing, infrastructure, and public services.

•
•

The project does not provide enough jobs for local community members; non-local groups are preferred for construction
works and/or during operations.

•

Increases in crime and domestic violence as a result of large inflows of workers and people seeking employment to
areas not accustomed to such flows in the past.

Abuse of labor rights

•

Abuses or exploitations of labor rights that threaten the quality of life of workers and prevent them from working safely.

Impacts on local
values

•

Impacts on the traditional value system and culture of local people.

Prostitution

•

Sexual violence and trafficking in areas not accustomed to such activities in the past.

Lack of local jobs
Crime

78

LESSONS FROM FOUR DECADES OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT RELATED CONFLICTS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Lack of community
benefits
Outsiders

Technology issues

•

Local communities do not benefit from the project, in terms of capacity building, educational, development, and training
initiatives, and investments in infrastructure and public services.

•
•
•

Organized groups or individuals with hidden personal interests.
Groups that use the project as leverage to achieve political goals.
Competitors fueling conflicts to delay projects.

•

Conflictive project technology selections e.g. technologies promoted as more environmentally friendly that have not
been tested before.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

GOVERNANCE DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
Lack of consultation.
Lack of understanding of the local language and culture.
Consultation conduced in a non-participatory manner with an unrealistic timeframe for completion and without
transparent feedback mechanisms.
Lack of principles of transparency and non-discrimination in the consultation process.
Lack of clarity on how stakeholders’ views are reflected in the decision-making process.
Failure to account for the cumulative impacts from many projects and the history of conflict in the region.
Lack of a long-term strategy on how the region should develop.
Lack of understanding of complex issues and needs of the region / communities.
Conflictive project site selections e.g. close to or within protected natural parks.
Failure to provide basic infrastructure services in isolated areas (lack of public investment).

Unrealistic
expectations

•

Unrealistic budget and schedule that put extra pressure on companies.

Insufficient local
participation in project
company

•

The project company does not include enough or any local community representatives or affiliates.

Lack of transparency

•
•

Lack of transparency in project documentation and the decision-making process.
Lack of adequate access to information and decision-makers.

•

Project actions or initiatives that violated applicable regulations and laws.

Lack of adequate
consultation

Deficient planning

Corruption

•
•
•

ECONOMIC DRIVERS OF CONFLICT
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Price of infrastructure
service
Excessive profit level
Unjust profit
distribution
Wage disputes
Government not
doing required works
Press
Administrative
Protests
Blockades
Litigation
Arbitration
Damage to property
Injuries
Violence
Deaths
Boycott of project

Reputational damage
Cost overruns
Project delays
Project redesign

•

Very high infrastructure service costs, such as the cost of energy provision or water supply.

•

Very high profit level of the project company that well exceeds that of companies in other comparable projects in the
country or region.

•

Project profits are not distributed equitably to local and/or regional communities.

•

Low wages, or wages that are not commensurate with project risks and challenging working environments.

•

The government does not implement the works it had agreed to in the project agreement.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

EXPRESSIONS OF CONFLICT
Press statements, use of online and print media, project campaigns.
Formal complaints and submissions to local, regional, state, and/or national government body.
Local, state, regional, and/or national demonstrations and strikes.
Blockades of roads, highways, ports, and/or project site entry points.
Claims in jurisdiction where company operates.
Formal requests for arbitrations with national and international courts, international organizations, and/or IFI and other
international body mechanisms.
Damage to equipment, buildings, and other private infrastructure.
To local communities, employees, or public and private security forces.
Violence to community members, project company representatives and employees, and public and private security
personnel.
Loss of human life (community members, project company representatives and employees, public and private security
personnel, among others).
Lack of willingness to use a new project.
CONSEQUENCES OF CONFLICT
Negative press coverage.
Companies are perceived as irresponsible or unaccountable, loss of the “social license to operate”.
Loss of investor confidence.
Time and resources devoted to dealing with conflicts.
Additional costs due to delays, shutdowns, and design modifications.
Delays in project activities or project shutdowns.
Additional works and design modifications.
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•
•
•
•

Relocation to a less conflictive site because of conflicts, most commonly to avoid damaging nearby natural
environments and disturbing local communities.
Fines due to violations of laws and regulations.
Exit of one or all partners from the project team due to conflicts.
Compensation and increased obligations out of court decisions, such as cleanup and remediation costs.
Legal costs, costs of settlement.

•

Amendment of concession terms because of conflicts.

•

Lack of foreign
investment

•
•
•
•
•
•

Imprisonment charges as a result of conflicts (primarily because of corruption, or violations of laws and regulations that
led to conflicts).
Productivity losses due to foregone infrastructure improvements, and project shutdowns and delays.
Disruption of production and/or supply of goods.
Lack of development due to project delays, suspensions, or cancellations.
Loss of income, and investments in infrastructure, public services, and capacity building for local communities.
Loss of project investment from foreign sources.
Investors are discouraged to invest in certain regions in LAC due to the high costs of social conflicts.

Government change

•

Government change because of ongoing conflicts.

Project relocation
Fines
Joint venture change
Redress payments
Concession
amendment
Imprisonment
Loss of productivity
Lack of development

•

COMPANY RESPONSE TO CONFLICTS
No action

•

Letting conflicts happen.

Press
statements

•

Statements through print and/or online media addressing conflicts.

Representatives
on site

•
•

Company representatives are in charge of assessing and preventing conflicts from escalating to more serious levels.
Representatives often partner with local leaders.

Bankruptcy

•

Project team members filing for bankruptcy due to high ongoing conflict resolution and/or operating costs.

Regulatory
compliance

•
•

Reviews and studies demonstrating compliance with all applicable laws and regulations.
Compliance with court decisions.
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Risk and conflict
management
framework

•

Development of a rigorous framework to identify, evaluate, and mitigate conflicts quickly and effectively.

Force

•

Direct use of force or increased use of private and/or public security personnel.

Regulatory
innovation

•
•
•
•
•

New processes and procedures that exceed applicable regulatory requirements.
Implementation of international standards and regulations that are not mandatory in a specific country.
Working with government to update conflicting regulations.
Implementation of innovative technologies.
Environmental and social initiatives at unprecedented scale and/or budget.

Consultation

•

Participation in consultation and/or negotiation roundtables to address conflicts.

Exit from project

•

Exit of one or all project team members from the project.

•
•

Independent experts act as intermediaries in case of disagreement.
Conflicted parties implement the recommendations of expert studies to resolve conflicts.

•

•
•

Economic transaction between the project company and community members as compensation for potential impacts,
and/or loss of land and resources.
Training, education, and capacity building initiatives to strengthen the skills and capabilities of local communities to
develop sustainably.
Specific initiatives targeted at enabling community members to be employed for project activities.
Identification of measures with high social impact, development of sustainability funds.

Community jobs

•

Allocation of jobs to local community members.

Community
project
participation

• Development of collaborative initiatives that involve community leaders and/or members in project activities, such as
water sampling, monitoring, and/or other general environmental management activities.

Community
infrastructure

• Development of new or improvements of existing infrastructure.

Community
equity stake

• Increase of the community’s project equity stake.

Independent
expert
participation
Community
cash payments
Community
capacity
building

•
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Government
equity stake

• Increase of the government’s project equity stake.

Environmental
improvements

• Investments in environmental improvements, such as water treatment facilities, or general environmental management
initiatives.

Environmental
restoration

• Investments in restorative efforts that aim to revitalize polluted or degraded ecosystems.

Reforestation

• Initiatives to plant seeds for trees that must be logged for project activities, and/or revitalize deforested ecosystems.
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APPENDIX N: COMPOSITE DEVELOPMENT INDICATOR
GDP per capita
(2015)

HDI

Democracy
Index

Rule of Law Index

Environmental Democracy Index (EDI)

Argentina

13,431.9

40

7

0.55

1.63

Belize

4,878.7

101

-

0.47

0.82

Bolivia

3,076.8

119

5.8

0.4

1.19

Brazil

8,538.6

75

7

0.55

1.80

Chile

13,416.2

42

7.8

0.68

1.67

Colombia

6,056.1

97

6.6

0.51

1.99

Costa Rica

11,206.1

69

8

0.68

1.52

Dominican
Republic

6,468.5

101

6.7

0.47

1.74

Ecuador

6,205.1

88

5.9

0.45

1.90

El Salvador

4,219.4

116

6.6

0.49

1.80

Guatemala

3,903.5

128

5.9

0.44

1.28

Honduras

2,528.9

131

5.8

0.42

1.29

Jamaica

5,232

99

7.4

0.57

1.11

Mexico

9,005

74

6.6

0.46

1.75

Nicaragua

2,086.9

125

5.3

0.42

1.60

Panama

13,268.1

60

7.2

0.52

2.02

Paraguay

4,081

112

6.3

-

1.06

Peru

6,027.1

84

6.6

0.51

1.87

Uruguay

15,573.9

52

8.2

0.72

1.30

Venezuela
12,265
71
5
0.28
1.56
Index Scales:
Rule of Law Index: Best value (complete rule of law) = 1; Worst value (complete absence of rule of law) = 0
Democracy Index: Full democracy (best) = 8-10; Flawed democracy = 6-8; Hybrid regime = 4-6; Authoritarian regime (worst) = 0-4.
Environmental Democracy Index: Best value = 3; Worst value = 0.
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RANK
GDP

RANK
HDI

RANK
DEMOCRACY
INDEX

Argentina

2

1

7

6

10

Belize

14

13

-

12

20

Bolivia

18

17

17

18

17

Brazil

8

8

6

5

6

Chile
Colombia

3
11

2
11

3
12

3
9

9
2

Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic

6

5

2

2

13

9

14

8

11

8

Ecuador

10

10

15

14

3

El Salvador

15

16

11

10

5

Guatemala

17

19

14

15

16

Honduras

19

20

16

17

15

Jamaica

13

12

4

4

18

Mexico

7

7

10

13

7

Nicaragua

20

18

18

16

11

Panama

4

4

5

7

1

Paraguay

16

15

13

-

19

Peru

12

9

9

8

4

Uruguay

1

3

1

1

14

Venezuela

5

6

19

19

12

RANK RULE OF
LAW

RANK EDI
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AVERAGE RANK

COMPOSITE INDICATOR RANK

Argentina

5.2

4

Belize

11.8

14

Bolivia

17.4

19

Brazil

6.6

6

4
9

1
9

Costa Rica
Dominican
Republic

5.6

5

10

10

Ecuador

10.4

12

El Salvador

11.4

13

Guatemala

16.2

17

Honduras

17.4

20

Jamaica

10.2

11

Mexico

8.8

8

Nicaragua

16.6

18

Panama

4.2

3

Paraguay

12.6

16

Peru

8.4

7

Uruguay
Venezuela

4
12.2

2
15

Chile
Colombia
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